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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Never in our lifetime has there been a more desperate need
for constructive dialogue, among individuals, among
communities, among cultures, among and between nations.
The threats are terrifying, but the responses are at hand
(United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 2008).
The above quote from the United Nations Secretary General outlines a growing
philosophy about how important dialogue is across cultures and people of varying
backgrounds. This is not simply a question of bickering between nations, although that
certainly is a problem. It is the question of how can disputes between nations be solved
when clashes between cultures lie at the very heart of the problems nations face. The
philosophy proposes that the ability to talk constructively with those from different walks
of life would diminish disputes between nations and people – or at least help to resolve
disputes rationally.
The United Nations has an organization, formed immediately after World War II,
whose specific purpose is to facilitate this type of dialogue. The United Nations
Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was formed as an
international organization designed to be freed from the restraints of politics in which
nations could talk constructively to change the “minds of men” about war. It was not
designed to be a policy-making organization, but rather a “big picture” organization to
coordinate educational and scientific ventures, but most importantly, to facilitate cultural
dialogue.
Yet almost from the outset, the organization was fraught with difficulty. The
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member nations could not agree upon what UNESCO’s role was, exactly. Hence,
individual nations treated UNESCO differently. This discord bubbled over with the
announcement of the United States’ declaration that it would leave UNESCO
membership, taking with it nearly 30% of the operational budget. Nearly 20 years later,
the U.S. returned to UNESCO membership in 2003 and that return has opened questions
about how UNESCO has changed and what might its value be in the future. Such a
question is even more timely, when one considers that UNESCO has changed its outlook
and focus to match the ideology of its director general – sometimes dramatically. Last
year (2009) UNESCO held new elections for the position of director general and
although the old issues have not surfaced publicly, internally there are rumblings.
Yet to date, no research has been done on UNESCO’s actions to facilitate a U.S.
return to membership. This dissertation seeks to explain how UNESCO reacted to the
departure of the United States specifically (but also the United Kingdom and Singapore)
in 1984 and what the organization did to bring about a U.S. return in 2003. It analyzes the
use of argumentation by UNESCO to persuade the U.S. that reforms had been made and
the changes had occurred which would make it in the interest of the U.S. to return to full
membership.
Such a discussion relating to UNESCO is infinitely relevant to the field of
international communication for many reasons. First, the use of language in
communication within organizations and between organizations has always been of
interest to the communication scholar. Second, as an international organization, issues
that affect the field of international relations become increasingly relevant to international
communication and vice versa. This is a topic that would be of interest to both fields.
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Third, communication scholars have long-since been interested in issues of culture. The
proposed dissertation will engage with ongoing discussions about culture, particularly
where related to issues of intellectual property, cross-cultural communication, cultural
diversity and international media. Finally, there is a relative lack of current research on
issues surrounding UNESCO as a whole. While it is true that recent research exists about
various UNESCO programs, there is a glaring void in research about the organization as
a whole. This is particularly true relating to UNESCO’s role in international
communication, as laid out in its foundational mandate. As the world perceptually draws
closer together through globalization, true engagement among different peoples with
conflicting issues of culture is truly needed. This is something UNESCO can and does
provide.
One of the main reasons for the establishment of UNESCO was to help monitor
international communication. Tracing UNESCO’s course and ideology from a
communication standpoint would yield valuable information for communication scholars
in general and would be helpful to international relations scholars as well. Additionally,
although there was much intellectual work relating to UNESCO during its role at the
forefront of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), which led
to the withdrawal of three nations from UNESCO, including the U.S., this debate has
faded into the background of intellectual evaluation. It is extremely timely with the
relatively recent return of the U.S. and Singapore to take a new look at where UNESCO
stands in its long-established mission. Issues of intellectual property, freedom of the
press, technology diffusion and cross-cultural communication all are affected by
UNESCO’s success, or lack thereof. It is essential to renew a discussion of these topics.
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Discovering how UNESCO altered its rhetoric and stance in order to convince the United
States to return to membership will provide great insight into how it attempts to move
forward with the resolution of core issues tied to its mandate that caused such
divisiveness during the years in which the U.S. felt the necessity to leave.
This chapter will establish the importance of research about UNESCO, especially
given the relative ambivalence to the organization, which seems to exist mostly in the
U.S. It will show that the importance of UNESCO is enhanced, given discussions about
globalization and culture – issues which UNESCO finds itself in the center of attention. It
will also trace the ideological foundation of UNESCO through the events leading up to
the U.S. withdrawal.

The Importance of UNESCO
A great tragedy is that in the 18 years that the U.S. has been
absent from UNESCO the world has made little progress in
what has been the great intellectual problematique of the
post-Second World War epoch: the crisis of universality.
The most startling evidence of that were the attacks of
September 11, 2001 – an act of ideological defiance as
much as it was of terrorism. The key question is whether in
the coming years the United States will engage with ideas
that it finds abhorrent by staying in UNESCO, or will
repeat the actions of the past by leaving when the going
gets tough (Alleyne, 2002).
Ideological foundation of UNESCO
The foundation of UNESCO is an excellent place to start when looking at the
seeds of discord that ultimately led up to the withdrawal of the U.S.. Yet it is also a good
place to start in evaluating where UNESCO stands today and why it is so important as a
topic of study.
UNESCO was born under the efforts of reconstructing Europe following World
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War II. It was during this post-war time period that leaders of nations realized that
preventing war would be more useful than traditional peace-keeping. The world had seen
the effect of the rise of nationalist movements in sparking the two world wars. Thus,
when the United Nations was created, several programs were established that were
designed to go farther than the failed League of Nations. These programs were designed
to reduce, as much as possible, all the factors leading up to the war (UNAC.org). Leaders
came to the conclusion that for this international organization to succeed in preventing
war, it needed to not only address the prevention of conflict, but also economic and social
development, human rights and the elimination of world hunger. It is during this time
period that the new concept of “human rights” was discussed, along with the first
attempts to codify them in international law, beginning with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. This declaration was passed in the General Assembly of the UN on
December 10, 1948. All of these issues were seen to be causes of conflict around the
world and thus, needs that had to be addressed by any successful world organization
(ibid).
It is under the backdrop of this discussion that the United Nations was formed.
Under the UN system, a functional dichotomy exists. This dichotomy exists along the
technical and political levels. The political/strategic side has come to be known as “high
politics” and refers to the United Nations, principally, as the body which handles the
relations between states and the policy that comes from those relations. High politics are
strategic in nature. Studies of development and culture have come to be known as “low
politics” and Specialized Agencies underneath the U.N., whose goals are the overseeing
of the technical matters such as communication, science, education and other human
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rights operate in this arena.
Under the functionalist approach, it was intended that the technical side be freed
from the constraints of the political side. Of utmost importance was that decisions on the
technical issues not be determined by the national interests of various nation-states. In
this sense functionalism is comparable to the U.S. idea of separation of church and state,
where religious matters were kept apart from policy matters to avoid the endless
contention that would stop anything from being accomplished. “Functionalism also
suggests a set of reasons for international conflict and prescribes for conflict resolution,
particularly through what might be described as functional conflict prevention, the preempting of violent conflict through the construction of cooperative relations based on
common interests in specific functional areas” (Ashworth & Long 1999).
It is under these assumptions that the U.N. and its Specialized Agencies were set
up. Using a functionalist approach, a multitude of organizations were formed under the
U.N. to control the technical issues that arise. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was set up to help struggling economies get back on track. The United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was set up to facilitate the
exchange of ideas and to promote human rights. The International Telecommunication
Union, one of the oldest international organizations, was co-opted into the UN system to
facilitate and regulate the growing use of wireless communication (radio, TV, satellite)
among nations. The purpose of these agencies was to address the problems that led to
World War II and were to be free from the constraints of politicization.
According to the preamble of UNESCO, which said that, "Since wars begin in the
minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."
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As also stated in the preamble, "the great and terrible war which has now ended was a
war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and
mutual respect of men and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and
prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races" (UNESCO web site). World
War II was too recent of an event when UNESCO was created for its founders to forget
that fact. UNESCO's purpose as a member of the UN family of organizations began
intending "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the
nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for
justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are
affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or
religion, by the Charter of the United Nations” (Ibid).
This beginning was a fine place to start, but even at the outset, it was unclear how
UNESCO planned to accomplish such lofty goals. International relations and
communication were being conducted under a structuralist paradigm, which focuses on
the system and relations of power between states, whereas the goals put forth in the
preamble were more focused on education, science and culture, looking to alleviate
tensions that lead to war “in the minds of men.” This kernel of conflict that had been
planted within UNESCO can be seen as early as 1948, when Richard McKeon stated that
UNESCO’s claim, “That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic
arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous,
lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore
be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.”
(UNESCO preamble) However, at the first General Conference, “The delegates came
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back again and again to the problem of a philosophy for UNESCO, and the record of
their discussion may be read as an expression of general agreement that the philosophic
problem of UNESCO consists, not in the discovery of a single true philosophy in which
all men must agree, but rather in the discovery of common courses of action and common
solutions of problems on which men might agree for different reasons” (McKeon, 1948).
The problem was that the world was very new to the concept of universal rights,
particularly as they related to culture and education. Most of the debate was precisely
about action and direction and other structural elements. The United States and other
western powers saw UNESCO as a vehicle for promoting democratic values and
combating tyranny. They provided the lion’s share of the budget and had ultimate
control, via numerous political means such as veto power and a stranglehold on
leadership positions, over the action taken by UNESCO.
The result was very little progress in defining the philosophical ground and taking
action towards those ends. The concepts of “promoting collaboration among the nations
through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for
the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed
for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion,” could
not be defined because different nations could not agree upon what “fundamental
freedoms” or “human rights” meant. As time would go on, and the Cold War ramped up,
developing nations seeking their own identities and solutions to their own problems
would inevitably come to use these statements to their advantage (Wells, 1987). This
would lead up to the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) years
and the eventual departure of the U.S., Great Britain and Singapore from UNESCO.
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UNESCO was at the crosshairs of the attack. By this time, the U.N. had admitted
so many nations from all parts of the world that there began to be a “new Third World
majority.” During this time of the Cold War, developing nations were part of the
battlefield being waged ideologically. The complaints made by Western countries against
UNESCO, particularly, the U.S. claimed that the organization had lost its sense of
purpose by succumbing to a “tyranny of the majority” (Senarclens, 1985).
Many examples of the complaints against UNESCO came from the debate over
the MacBride Commission report: Many Voices, One World. This was a source of
contention with western countries and became a long-standing feud between the U.S. and
UNESCO (Schiller, 1989). The major powers of the time had found ways to maintain
their stranglehold over the governing process at the political level by first overseeing the
process of membership. Secondly, they instituted a system of weighted representation,
which gave the major players veto power. Finally, they had control (from the developing
nation’s viewpoint) in that the headquarters were all located within the borders of major
powers and the staff and leadership within was all from the developed world.
It was during these years that there began to be a rising wave of countries desiring
to return to the ideological base upon which UNESCO was founded. The desire was to
provide access to communication and knowledge for all humans worldwide. UNESCO
was seen by many as the ideal vehicle to promote this universality in communication and
information. This movement began the highly debated NWICO, proposed in many
venues, but stemming from the New International Economic Order, proposed in UN
resolution 3201 of May, 1974. At the heart of this movement were some of the tenets
spelled out in the UNESCO General Conference in Belgrade, 1980. Some of these were:
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a. this new world information and communication order could be based, among
other considerations, on:

1. elimination of the imbalances and inequalities which characterize the
present situation;
2. elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private,
and excessive concentrations;
3. removal of the internal and external obstacles to a free flow and wider and
better balanced dissemination of information and ideas;
4. plurality of sources and channels of information;
5. freedom of the press and information;
6. the freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication
media, a freedom inseparable from responsibility;
7. the capacity of developing countries to achieve improvement of their own
situations, notably by providing their own equipment, by training their
personnel, by improving their infrastructures and by making their
information and communication media suitable to their needs and
aspirations;
8. the sincere will of developed countries to help them attain these objectives;
9. respect for each people's cultural identity and for the right of each nation to
inform the world public about its interests, its aspirations and its social and
cultural values;
10. respect for the right of all peoples to participate in international exchanges
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of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit;
11. respect for the right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of
individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively
in the communication process:
b. this new world information and communication order should be based on the
fundamental principles of international law, as laid down in the Charter of the
United Nations;
c. diverse solutions to information and communication problems are required
because social, political, cultural and economic problems differ from one country
to another and, within a given country, from one group to another (UNESCO
1980).
This growing conflict between ideologies, (Consoli, 1987; Lent, 1977; Alisky,
1988; Masmoudi, 1979) centered around UNESCO and the NWICO debate, culminated
in the series of events that led to the withdrawal of the U.S., the U.K. and Singapore in
1984 and 1985 respectively. The predominant paradigm in U.S. politics regarding
UNESCO was the hope that UNESCO could be the vehicle upon which to fight the Cold
War and Communist ideology. The U.S. mindset of the time was to fight the spreading
communist message in the Third World – the very proponents of the NWICO movement
who were fighting for equal access to means of communication and information (Coate,
1989, Imber, 1990).
The points of contention the U.S. and others had with UNESCO can be summed
up in the letter sent to UNESCO by Secretary of State George Schultz notifying the
organization of the U.S. intent to withdraw. “We have been concerned that trends in
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policy, ideological emphasis, budget and management of UNESCO were detracting from
the organization’s effectiveness. We believe these trends have led UNESCO away from
the original principles of its constitution” (Schiller, 1989).
The departures of the U.S., Great Britain and Singapore, along with their reasons
for departure are evidence of the change in paradigm regarding international relations and
communication. International relations was undergoing a “cultural turn” with its greater
focus on cultural impact on relations between states. At the same time, other scholars
point to an “argumentative turn” in policy analysis and planning (Fischer & Forrester,
1993). Former Director General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, has stated that it was
during this period, that UNESCO was forced to re-define itself and discover its place in
international society (Mayor, 2007). Former director of UNESCO’s Division of Human
Rights and Peace, Pierre de Senarclens, withdrew from his appointment at UNESCO on
principle, in part because of politicization, but also because he felt that the culture of the
organization at the time of his departure had stifled true intellectual dialogue and was
symptomatic of its problems (Senarclens, 1985).
U.S. views about UNESCO’s relevance
It is no secret that the UN and its various organizations have been viewed
skeptically by many in the United States. The prevailing attitude in the US towards
international agencies has been that as long as the organization serves the needs of the
U.S., it is useful. There has been little tolerance for oppositional ideas. As was stated
before, UNESCO was founded on the principle that knowledge and universality were the
keys to peace. For many years, the U.S. viewed these organizations as the prime means of
fighting the Cold War. With UNESCO this is particularly true, and it is proof of this
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viewpoint that when the “new majority” of countries began flexing its combined muscles
– some of it with the encouragement of Moscow – Washington began to see less and less
value in the organization as a whole. As Mark Alleyne said it, “the world political scene
and the USA’s position in that dynamic process were very different. Through the prism
of Cold War politics Washington saw UNESCO as nothing more than an ideological
accomplice of the Eastern Bloc and what were seen as its Third World lackeys” (Allyene
2002).
One of the prevailing attitudes in Washington (and, indeed among many U.S.
citizens) is that because the U.S. pays so much of the budget of UN organizations, it
should benefit the U.S. most of all. In fact, this attitude leads many Americans to believe
that international organizations do not accomplish anything at all and that membership is
a waste of money (Shawn 2006, Schaefer 2001).
Issues of rampant budgetary inefficiency, poor spending practices, nepotism and
corruption within UN organizations, including UNESCO, have not made the U.S. views
about UNESCO any brighter. Fox News reporter Eric Shawn did a thorough job of
explaining what many American have felt toward the UN and its organizations in his
book “The U.N. Exposed: How the United Nations Sabotages America’s Security and
Fails the World” (Shawn 2006). While the book contains numerous examples chosen to
prove corruption within the organization, its very existence (and the fact that it was a
New York Times Best Seller) illustrates the self-centered approach many American have
about international organizations.
While there are many proponents of international organization, and UNESCO in
particular (Americans For the Universality of UNESCO, for example), it appears that the
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opposition is much more vocal – and the cases of corruption which surface from time to
time do not help. One of the leading voices against UNESCO over the course of the last
25 years has been the Heritage Foundation. In fact, in an article published in the
foundation’s newsletter, Brett Schaefer (2001) said that the U.S. should not rejoin
UNESCO. In fact the language used in support of his thesis, exposes the self-centered
viewpoint held by many Americans about how an organization needs to benefit the U.S.
most of all if it is a worthwhile expense of our tax dollars. “President Bush should not
yield to pressure to rejoin UNESCO, even if it appears to be an attractive low-cost way to
deflect international charges of isolationism or to deflate pressure to pay U.S. arrears to
the United Nations without assurances of reform. The President should instead take time
to evaluate UNESCO’s current priorities and progress toward reform.” Finally, this
statement sums up how many view participation in UNESCO. “President Bush must
recognize that even if UNESCO were a paragon of management and efficiency, it is
unclear how America would benefit from membership in the organization” (Schaefer
2001).
Nevertheless, despite the antagonistic approach to UNESCO seen by many
Americans, there are a few who still see use in this forum organization whose goals are to
provide a place for an open exchange of ideas, scientific exchange, and cultural
understanding and preservation. Even the Reagan Administration, when it took the U.S.
out of UNESCO felt compelled to make a plan for compensation in the areas that
UNESCO provided so much value. In a report issued from the international affairs office
of the National Research Council, the president of the National Academy of Sciences
stated that “the governing board of the National Research Council and the Council of the
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National Academy of Sciences are deeply concerned about the potential impacts on
science of a withdrawal by the United States from UNESCO” (NRC 1984). The report
went on to say that U.S. participation in UNESCO science projects was “invaluable” and
that a withdrawal from the organization would have wide-reaching results in the scientific
community alone (ibid). The report went on to suggest a few points that the U.S.
government must consider should it decide to withdraw.
First, the NRC stated that there was “no viable overall alternative” to accomplish
what UNESCO does for science. In fact, the report said that withdrawal would be likely
to result in a “multiplicity of channels for coordinating scientific research” that may or
may not be more or less effective. It also said that U.S. withdrawal would jeopardize the
chances of U.S. scientists to occupy lead roles in ongoing projects.
Second, the NRC pointed out that the withdrawal would likely result in the danger
of fragmentation of research. Along with this is the rise of the cost of scientific
administration that “cannot be overestimated. However, the fact that UNESCO’s
activities include both development assistance programs and programs aimed at the
advancement of scientific research makes the search for a single alternative extremely
difficult, if not impossible” (ibid).
Finally, the report went on to list a series of alternative arrangements needed to
maintain scientific cooperation in the absence of membership in UNESCO. It is
noteworthy to point out that the costs of these interim arrangements by far outweigh the
costs of membership in UNESCO – a fact which virtually eliminates the argument of
expense as a reason for withdrawing from UNESCO (ibid).
In summary, Paul Kennedy, a well-known scholar on international organizations,
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wrote in his book entitled The Parliament of Man: Past Present, and Future of the United
Nations that “it is difficult to imagine how much more riven and ruinous our world of six
billion would be if there had been no UN social, environmental, and cultural agendas –
and no institutions to attempt to put them into practice on the ground” (Kennedy 2006).
Kennedy repeatedly throughout the book discusses the value of being involved in
dialogue with nations and peoples of differing ideas and cultures – a principle value of
UNESCO as a whole.
The world’s view of UNESCO’s importance
Despite the fact that the bulk of discussion about UNESCO in the U.S. appears to
have followed the same pattern of criticism about corruption and mismanagement that the
U.N. in general has faced, UNESCO seems to have a much higher standing in the eyes of
those outside the U.S. and U.K. Those within the U.S. who have remained in favor of
participation in UNESCO have echoed what has been said worldwide – that the principal
value of UNESCO is in its ability to provide a safe forum for peoples of differing cultures
and ethnicities to come together and have dialogue. In general, praise for UNESCO – and
claims about its importance – has centered around the three areas of its original mandate
– education, science and culture. While much has been made of UNESCO literacy efforts
and scientific coordination (and the U.S. continued to participate in many of these from
the outside even during its absence), the communication scholar should be particularly in
the praise UNESCO receives in its efforts relating to culture.
UNESCO, as a forum organization, is at the forefront when varying cultures come
together. It becomes a microcosm of cultures coming together throughout the world.
Because its policies are non-binding, their principal value becomes rhetorical. They
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provide a unifying rhetoric and help establish sets of principles and values. They provide
discourse for local policy makers to draw upon that is internationally shared and goes a
long way to establishing global norms. Unlike its efforts in coordinating scientific
research or educational programs, the bulk of its value in culture is in providing a global
dialogue and rhetoric in the establishment of shared global values and norms. Member
nations are not bound to adhere to its cultural declarations, yet the rhetoric contained
therein contains substantial weight upon bodies that do make policy.
Richard Hoggart, a British scholar, said that the hardest, but most valuable of
UNESCO’s work lies in its “inching towards norms on issues which cannot avoid brining
ideologies into play.” He states that UNESCO is a “privileged place in that it brings
together in an international context governments – those who make decisions – and
people who are at the forefront of the study of contemporary problems. In this way
UNESCO is important as a centre for international dialogue among experts of all kinds
and also intellectuals” (Hoggart, 1978). Sagarika Dutt succinctly described UNESCO as a
“world resource centre that collects facts from all over the world, in all its areas of
competence, which it then standardizes so that they are uniformly and internationally
available” (Dutt, 1999).
It cannot be denied that occasionally the polarization of ideologies can have a
dramatic effect on UNESCO as a forum organization. The NWICO debates resulting in
the withdrawal of the U.S. is but one stark example, albeit extreme. The mere fact that the
U.S. decided to depart from UNESCO is evidence of the value the weight the
organization carries. Australian scholar Joost Smiers wrote that, “UNESCO shapes,
structures and stabilizes the language, priorities and instruments (including statistical
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instruments) of government. It provides ready narratives which connect up diverse policy
domains into compelling and connected programs for action. In providing a meta-level
framework through its declarations, statements of principle and plans of action, UNESCO
provides ways of thinking about issues and problems, ordering priorities and legitimizing
governmental attention to certain matters” (Smiers, 2004).
Examples of this power include UNESCO initiatives like the recent Universal
Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(2000), and the Global Alliance for Cultural Diversity. Many of these documents,
produced with considerable debate, and having no binding policy power, have been cited
in many policy-making governmental and non-governmental bodies around the world and
are likely to have an impact for years to come on policies and priorities of these bodies
(Smiers, 2004).
To illustrate the importance of research on the rhetoric of UNESCO, just after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, a number of states, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan
and Algeria asked UNESCO for rhetorical assistance to break the imaginary link between
Islam and terrorism (Smiers, 2004). Other such requests have been fielded by UNESCO
from states and non-governmental agencies who have come to realize and appreciate the
power UNESCO can wield to create international norms through the rhetorical power of
its documents and speeches. Even press bodies have asked for help in campaigns to stop
the murder and threats against journalists (ibid).
Many of the same authors have suggested that UNESCO is best positioned to take
on the much-needed academic debate on issues like intellectual property, copyright
protection and enforcement, and most especially, cultural diversity. While many
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agencies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual
Properties Organization (WIPO) have been tasked with the policy end of this debate, they
are not equipped to tackle the diversity of ideologies that have existed on the subject
since long before the NWICO debates on the floor of UNESCO. What has suffered was
the discussion on cultural diversity that has led many nations from the south to complain
that all viewpoints are not being considered.
Even the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has attempted to provide
this open forum brining together policy makers and those from the information society
and the communication society in the form of the World Summit on Information Society
(WSIS), which has held two summits in recent years. Oddly enough, UNESCO was not
invited to participate in or help organize such a forum, despite wide recognition that it
was interested and qualified to do so (Siochuru, 2004). UNESCO, itself has recognized
the need to have such a forum, and has proceeded with its initiatives on cultural diversity.
UNESCO’s Executive board has published that one of its goals was to “… focus on
development issues to which communication and information can make a meaningful
contribution and would provide a forum for all who wish to contribute to the search for
international consensus in these matters” (UNESCO, 1996). The Executive Board also
said that it “views favorably the proposal to organize a UNESCO conference on
information and communication for development, following the consultations and
reflections seen in the current biennium and as a joint undertaking with other competent
and interested institutions of the United Nations system, provided that sufficient
resources can be mobilized within the Organization and with external partners” (ibid).
Such a conference has yet to take place, and some scholars have pointed out that
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one reason other international organizations have failed to provide a forum for dialogue is
that the U.S. presence, power, and ideological position against action or dialogue to
protect cultural diversity have been strong. On the other hand, UNESCO has proposed
such conferences and laid out a clear need and many outside the U.S. say it is uniquely
qualified to pull off such a conference. UNESCO’s rhetoric may be reflective of the fact
that it is the one UN organization in which the U.S. influence has significantly waned and
is still recovering from its long absence (Siochuru, 2004).
The difference between how the U.S. views UNESCO and what it stands for,
versus much of the rest of the world can be seen in the in the intense debate leading up to
the defeat of the U.S. position on UNESCO’s 2005 Convention on the Protection of the
Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions. Many communication scholars
have described the presence of two basic positions in this debate – the liberalist position,
which argues for a free market economy, and the culturalist position, which argues for the
protection of local culture against invading cultural content (Moghadam, 2008).
The culturalist side of this debate was led by France and Canada, each of which
have strong protection in place for local culture and language. The liberalist side was led
by the U.S., with Australia and Japan taking strong stands as well. Interestingly, some of
the culturalist nations actually accused the U.S. of being culturalist because only 2% of
the programming aired in the U.S. was imported. However, the U.S. refuted this
vehemently by saying that this was more of a reflection of market choice than
protectionism. Ultimately, the convention was adopted with the only negative votes being
the U.S. and Israel. Australia abstained, citing previous treaty requirements, as did a
number of developing nations (including Liberia, Nicaragua and Honduras) because of
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intense pressure coming from the United States.
UNESCO, globalization and culture
This prospectus has argued that UNESCO has value in establishing rhetoric that
can be drawn upon for discourse by media, governments and people worldwide. It has
also argued that many nations worldwide (and even many scholars and politicians in the
U.S.) see UNESCO as a valuable organization for its unique qualifications in being able
to bring peoples of various backgrounds together to discuss complex issues. It is
important now to draw attention to the areas of current academic and political debate
within which UNESCO finds itself at the forefront.
For scholars of international communication and some from the discipline of
international relations, those areas are globalization and culture. These two areas contain
intense debates on issues such as the flow of news, media and culture between countries,
the protection of local media and culture, intellectual property rights, and access to
communication technology – especially in developing nations. All of these issues have
been present on the floor of UNESCO and the language adopted by the various
documents produced has been used in many different venues.
During the 1980s, the concept of globalization began receive attention within a
wide range of disciplines. This intellectual focus on globalization and its implications
was brought about in part by a desire to understand the nature of the socio-economic and
cultural changes, which seemed to be enveloping the developed world. This gave rise to a
growing field of research, which sought to analyze the ways in which daily existence,
right down to the cultural level, within most countries was becoming increasingly
enmeshed with people of different backgrounds. Within this context, the mass media was
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capable of bringing to an audience’s immediate attention distant events, thus creating a
sense of a globally shared community.
While the term ’globalization’ is widely used in many fields of literature, the use
and meaning of the term remain contested. One less-contended definition says that,
globalization refers to the rapidly developing process of complex interconnections
between societies, markets, cultures, institutions, and individuals world-wide (Harvey,
1989). Globalization is a process that involves a compression of time and space,
shrinking distances through a dramatic reduction in the time taken to cross them (either
literally, as in air travel, or perceptually, as in electronic communication), which in turn
makes the world seem smaller, bringing humans into closer contact with each other than
ever before possible. Most scholars appear to agree that with the phenomenon of
globalization, no community or culture can be completely isolated. The previously
described NWICO debates on the floor of UNESCO represent one of the first real clashes
stemming from the globalization process. None of the nations involved was truly
prepared to engage in dialogue with opposing sides, especially related to the exploding
field of electronic media and information (Smiers, 2004).
Indeed, globalization and culture are oftentimes discussed in the same breath.
With the brining together of the world through electronic communication, much
discussion has taken place in academic circles about the global flow of culture. One
researcher, Arjun Appadurai, identified five dimensions of global cultural flow: 1)
ethnoscapes (the movement of tourists, immigrants, refugees and guest workers); 2)
mediascapes (the worldwide distribution of information through newspapers, magazines,
TV programs and films through the various electronic methods of distribution); 3)
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technoscapes (the distribution of technologies); 4) finanscapes (global capital flows); and
5) ideoscapes (the distribution of political ideas and values and ideologies) (Appadurai,
1990, 1996). Of these dimensions, UNESCO is central to three: mediascapes,
technoscapes, and ideoscapes.
Many have attempted to define culture, a complex construct seen as multi-layered
(Sinclair 1999). Raymond Williams (1962) viewed culture as a communally-shared
lifestyle forged by such things as “values, traditions, beliefs, material objects, and
territory” (Lull 1995). Similarly, many regard culture as a relatively stable phenomenon,
stemming from both environmental and biological factors—religion, ethnicity, class,
language, and family—that largely influence daily patterns of life (Lull 1995). This
definition of culture has led some to argue that individuals do not drift very far from
“blood and belief, faith and family” (Huntington 1996). This link between groups and
culture is most clearly put forth in Benedict Anderson’s (1991) famous term “imagined
community,” though given the numerous aspects of culture (Castells 1997), Anderson’s
concept might more appropriately be called “imagined communities.”
However, scholars also recognize the fluid nature of culture as it adapts and is
transformed (Lull 1995). Taking a more communication-centric view of culture, Clifford
Geertz, defined it as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in
symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of
which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes
toward life” (Geertz 1973, 89). Thus Geertz rejected deterministic notions of culture,
instead arguing that “culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors,
institutions, or processes can be casually attributed; it is a context” (Geertz 1983, 14). It
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would seem, then, that if Geertz is correct and culture is fundamentally contextual and
communicative in nature, altering context and communication content or patterns would
have the effect of likewise altering culture. Possibly because of this nexus between
culture, context, and communication, it has been argued that “there is no natural
distinction between media and culture,” and that “to discuss culture in the absence of
media is impossible” (Dorfman 2004, 7-8).
It is therefore not surprising that initial studies investigating the impact of media
on culture resulted in the prognosis that media was becoming a vehicle of cultural
hegemony wherein “stronger” cultures attempted to remake “weaker” ones after their
own image, a form of modern imperialism (Mattelart 1980). Such theoretical contentions
are also largely influenced by dependency theory from the field of political economy,
which posits that “poorer” nations become dependent on “richer” nations, whether that be
in material or cultural goods (Bolana, Matrini, and Sierra 2004). Dependency theorists
see the relationship between advanced nations and less developed countries as one of
center-periphery, with power—both political and economic—disproportionately located
in the center, benefiting advanced nations as the expense of peripheral nations (Tansey
and Hyman 1994). Thus “poorer” regions are held back by their dependency on foreign
media programming and foreign culture (Sinclair 1999). This perceived one-way flow of
information was also at the heart of the NWICO debates on the floor of UNESCO with
hopes of combating cultural media imperialism (Sinclair 1999) given that dependency
theory portended a homogenized internationalization of elites and upper middle classes
around the world (Salinas and Paldan 1979).
Cultural media imperialism theory is largely based on the work of Schiller (1969)
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and Mattelart (1980), with Mattelart positing that
ideology and culture [are] power practices, and in this sense ‘cultural
imperialism’ can be considered a model of organization of power. This
power seeks a homogenization, a demobilization and disorganization, a
consensus. A people deprived of its culture, its customs, its own style of
life, is just as defenseless as if it had been robbed of its raw materials (69).
Hence Western culture, led by American media, seeks to globalize (or Americanize)
world cultures, subjugating them much like imperial colonizers in history (Kivikuru
1995). While Schiller (1974) viewed cultural media imperialism as largely a byproduct of
the “age of electronic communications” (110), Tunstall (1977) contended that cultural
imperialism predates television and its origins can be found 19th century American and
British international news agencies.
Other theorists added to the growing din of cultural media imperialism
scholarship. Elihu Katz (1977) was unoptimistic that “authentic cultures” could survive
the onslaught of new, foreign media. Glen Fisher (1987) saw international culture
imported via media as a significant threat to the cultures of traditional societies. Richard
Peet posited that “in the interaction between centre culture, regional culture and
traditional cultures,…the tendency is towards the production of one world mind, one
world culture and the consequent disappearance of regional consciousness flowing from
the local specificities of the human past” (1986, 195). Building on the notion of media
and cultural imperialism, Duane Varan (1998) likened the influence of media to cultural
erosion, with foreign media engaging in abrasion (erosion by friction), deflation (removal
of loose material), deposition (addition of foreign materials), and saltation (the scattering
of local materials). And media scholars have imported the notion of acculturation from
intercultural contact research, wherein the meeting of disparate cultures leads to cultural
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change (Clement, Baker, Josephson, and Noels 2005).
On the other hand, and also discussed in various circles on the floor of UNESCO,
the cultural flow model is based on the notion that the understanding of Western power as
cultural imperialism is too simplistic. Maybe globalization is both more ambiguous and
less ominous than what is described in the cultural imperialism model. Cultural
influences do not necessarily follow the linear paths that the cultural imperialism model
would predict.
In the cultural flow model, the process of cultural globalization is a de-centralized
one, a process that produces often-changing patterns of advantage and disadvantage
throughout the international system. An important feature of globalization today is its deWesternization, with the emergence of some non-Western nations - like Japan - as key
actors. Information technology, as the driving force of economic globalization, has
become a useful instrument for propagating cultural flows emanating from what has
traditionally been considered the periphery. Proponents of this model do not intend to say
that traditional forms of creation and dissemination of media and culture are not under
threat, rather that the origin of the threat is not as centralized as thought. Globalized
cultural industries, whether originating in the core or the periphery, have impacted local
culture. In many instances, a local culture’s role as an integral part of people's lives is
eroded and it ceases to serve as the means of constructing societal values, reproducing
group identity and building social cohesion. If allowed to continue on unchecked, the end
result could be global integration at the expense of local disintegration.
Thus, many governments have reacted to today’s cultural globalization by
following one of two equally extreme strategies: either an exaggerated attachment to an
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often reinvented past in the name of tradition and culture; or attempts at a wholesale
adoption of anything and everything foreign in an attempt to aspire to full membership in
international society.
In short, globalization and culture are being discussed with increasing frequency
on a global scale. In academia, this has been the case for many years. However, on the
level of international organizations and governance, this has not been the case. As
pointed out earlier, UNESCO was set up to provide just that type of forum for shaping
“the minds of men.” But the U.S. and other powers used UNESCO under a functionalist
mentality to spread their ideology. This mentality was used to squelch open discussion
about media and culture and when it was unable to do so (in the case of NWICO), the
U.S. decided to withdraw, rather than engage in discussion it found distasteful.
This chapter has traced the foundation of UNESCO and established its importance
to some in the United States, but especially to those around the world. It has brought in
the discussion about globalization and culture and linked this discussion to UNESCO.
Most importantly, it has shown how research about UNESCO is relevant and important,
given that the debates that have raged in UNESCO for decades are still present. Many of
these tensions have spilled over into unfortunate events of violence across the world.
More than ever, the forum that UNESCO provides for dialogue among cultures is needed
if headway is to be made towards a reduction of violence and terrorism.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of Literature
Many scholars have done research about international organizations. Many of
these come from the discipline of international relations. Still others have done research
on international organizations. Communication scholars have done extensive research in
the field of international communication and culture. The study of globalization has also
been an area of fertile research for communication scholars. Still others have done
research on the use of rhetoric and argumentation in national and international
organizations. However, the study of UNESCO offers the opportunity to bring many
fields together in the study of communication and culture. This chapter attempts to
review work done in a few of these fields that has a bearing on UNESCO. Its goal is to
highlight great analysis and research being done, yet draw attention to blind spots
specifically related to UNESCO.
Although there were many short-sighted reasons for the U.S. departure from
UNESCO, there were also some very good outcomes of the departure. The departure
forced UNESCO to deal with several legitimate internal problems that the U.S. cited as
“official” reasons for departure. While the actual extent of reforms within UNESCO can
be debated, what can be seen is what many scholars are calling “turns” both in
international relations research and in policy analysis within international organizations.
These “turns,” known as the “cultural turn” in international relations, and the
“argumentative turn” in policy analysis were taking place as the beginning of the
discussion about globalization. The U.S. departure from UNESCO took place right as
these changes were beginning to take place. These turns both brought focus more on
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culture and the important role of communication.
The “cultural turn” in international relations
During the 1990’s, the field was in the middle of what is known as the cultural
turn. Indeed, IR researchers are still debating the concept of culture and cultural diversity
in the field (eg. Brown, 2001; Mulhern, 2000).
For the past two decades, and perhaps even further, a central locus of discussion
in international relations theory has centered on the debate between two perspectives –
liberalism and realism. The debate and research in both fields has been intense, but
extremely beneficial as it has served to sharpen the philosophies of both through trial and
error. However, a new way of conceptualizing International Relations, called
constructivism, began to emerge in the early 1990’s when Alexander Wendt, largely
credited with bringing constructivism to international relations, questioned some of the
basic elements of both liberalism and realism (Wendt 1992). Perhaps the most questioned
element of both is the adherence to the materialistic view of politics – the idea that an
actor (state) will operate in its own best interest and that said interest is principally based
on a materialist conception of reality. A good part of the debate between realists and
liberalists has centered around the extent to which relative or absolute gains-seeking
behavior occurs in international politics.
Constructivists have no qualms with most of what the other traditions say or do,
but rather, they attempt to point out what the others ignore. Constructivists say that what
gets ignored commonly is the content and sources of state interest and the very real social
fabric that influences world politics. In doing so, constructivists reach out to other
disciplines, most notably sociology and anthropology, to establish firm ground. Since this
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area of international relations is so new, standing on the foundation built by other
disciplines makes sense. Why reinvent the wheel? Also, borrowing from other disciplines
has become commonplace as our world grows perceptually smaller. In this manner,
constructivists have expanded the theoretical discourse within international relations.
Constructivism has stretched the boundaries of international relations theory by
bringing out two assumptions (Wendt 1995). First, it assumes that the environment in
which actors (states, politicians, world governing bodies, etc.) take action is social as well
as material. The assumption is that material structures are given meaning only by the
social context in which they operate, or are interpreted. The best example is the
environment about nuclear weapons. As constructivists point out, most politicians and
individuals in North America and Europe show little concern over the fact that Britain
has a tremendous stash of nuclear weapons. But the mere thought that North Korea would
be testing or in possession of even one nuclear weapon generates extreme tension in the
international community. The reason for this is socially constructed.
The second assumption put forward by constructivists is that the mere realization
of the impact of social constructs can provide actors or states with the means to construct
their own interests. It becomes a form of empowerment that liberates states from the arms
of materialism. It also is shown in how constructivists emphasize the interaction between
agent and structure. For liberalists and realists, the agent establishes the structure, making
the structure subservient to the agent. Ontologically, both agent and structure are equal,
leaving open the discussion of identity formation and that state interests emerge from
interaction with structures (Wendt 1995). Neoliberalists and realists haven’t found the
way to deal with this problem, as can be seen in Robert Powell’s “Anarchy in
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International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal debate,” (Powell 1994) and
other such literature in international relations journals. From both the neoliberal and
neorealist point of view, everything is agent-centered (the state). This individualistic
viewpoint reduces everything to a discussion of the individual state and its goals and
plans without focusing on how the social environment can shape those goals and plans.
In short, for constructivists, much research concerns the logic of appropriateness.
The discussion is not a means-end discussion. Rather, constructivist stake the claim that
actors ask “What kind of situation is this?” and “How should I react now?” when
situations arise. Social norms help supply the answers to those questions. In that manner,
norms help the actor/state arrive at an understanding of what interests are. Wendt and
other constructivists borrowed the concept of logic of appropriateness from other
disciplines in developing this position (March & Olsen 1989). In contrast, the
neoliberalists and neorealists in international relations theory can be categorized as
rational choice scholars in which the actor makes a rational decision based on interests.
This means-end process assumes much about what those interests are. Often they are
materially-oriented. To these scholars, norms are little more than constraints to actors
operating in self-interest, operating under a logic of consequence that stresses utility
maximization (Weingast, 1995).
What this represents is an ontological difference between constructivists on one
hand and neoliberalists and neorealists (very different themselves) on the other.
Epistemologically, constructivists have little or no quarrel with either theory. This puts
them on solid ontological ground with postmodernists, who also focus on issues of
interest and identity and norms. Where constructivists differ from postmodernists is in
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substantive matters, such as what the role of identity or discourse actually is. In other
words, constructivists share ontological ground with postmodernists, but are different
epistemologically. In comparison to neoliberalists and neorealists, constructivists share
epistemological ground, but differ ontologically. This would suggest the possibility to
bridge the differences between rational choice scholars and postmodernists – a very
valuable possibility.
The concept of “norms” has gained much play in literature over the past couple of
decades. To use this concept as an example, for neorealists norms lack causal authority.
Consideration of norms as a means of determining interest, therefore, does not make
sense. For neoliberalists, norms can play an influential role in certain areas, but even still,
norms are a structure built on a material base. Their function is to help actors maximize
their material gains or utility. For liberalists, agents create norms, not the other way
around. In contrast, for constructivists, norms are “collective understandings that make
behavioral claims on actors. Their effects reach deeper. They constitute actor identities
and interests. They do not simply regulate behavior. As explanatory variables, their status
moves from intervening to independent” (Wendt, 1995). In other words, norms are not
merely a superstructure built on a materialist base, as liberals would claim. Rather, the
actors/states and the structures, or global norms, interact with each other and are mutually
constituted.
To give a specific example of these differences, Martha Finnemore wrote a book
(Finnemore 1996) that specifically questions on ontological grounds the current direction
of scholarly work based on the means-end, rational choice theory and the definition of
state interest calculations as the dominant model of determining state behavior and
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specifically the role of international organizations. Finnemore’s stated goal is to move
away from the actor-centered approach to center more on the actor-structure interaction.
She argues that a logic of appropriateness approach is just as plausible in determining
state behavior as is logic of consequences. She postulates that systemic norms propagated
from international organizations help determine and define state interests and can be
useful in predicting behavior. They provide direction in determining interests and
guidance in setting goals.
Finnemore uses this framework to carry out three case studies, which deal with
how international organizations played a key role in shaping and changing state interests.
She argued her case by using a two-pronged analytical method. First, she evaluated a
correlation between the emergence of new norms and the subsequent change in state
interest and policy. Then she looked at the discourse to see if the changes were consistent
with systemic norms.
Another good example of a constructivist viewpoint is the case study done by
Michael Barnett (who, coincidentally teamed up with Finnemore recently to publish a
new book on international relations). In the case study, Barnett cites the example of
Rwanda, where UN peacekeepers pulled out right at the moment they were most needed.
Most agree that this was done because the member nations were unwilling to commit
resources to an operation that fell outside their interests. He says that international
organizations fall prey to indifference (and thus inaction) for a few reasons. He cites
Michael Herzfeld’s The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring Symbolic Roots of
Western Bureaucracy (1993) in listing five reasons indifference in international
organizations occurs. First, bureaucracies, such as the UN differentiate members from
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nonmembers, which makes the plight of nonmembers less compelling that those of
members. Second, Herzfeld says that “indifference is a rejection of those who are
different.” Third, bureaucracies apply rights differently even among members of the
community and that this cannot be reduced to politics or economics exclusively, but also
based upon identity criteria such as race, religion and gender. Fourth, bureaucrats can
become indifferent because they not only identify with their community, but also with
their bureaucracy. Bureaucrats will often identify with their bureaucracy before they will
with the community they represent.
Finally, Herzfeld says that bureaucrats pursue not only a bureaucratic agenda, but
also a personal one, striving to accomplish personal goals and achievements. This is a
purely constructivist approach to looking at international organization. It is one that looks
at both the individual and the system/structure equally to determine behavior. This is
where there is great possibility to link discussions of the public in communication to
discussions of politics in international relations.
This cultural turn can be seen on a larger scale as well. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama
wrote a very controversial article entitled “The End of History,” followed by a 1993 book
entitled “The End of History and the Last Man.” In this book he argues that the
ideological battle has concluded with the Cold War and that from this point forward,
Western liberal democracy will be the final form of human government. “But if, over
time, more and more societies with diverse cultures and histories exhibit similar longterm patterns of development; if there is a continuing convergence in the types of
institutions governing most advanced societies; and if the homogenization of mankind
continues as a result of economic development, then the idea of relativism may seem
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much stranger than it does now. For the apparent differences between peoples’
‘languages of good and evil’ will appear to be an artifact of their particular stage of
historical development” (Fukuyama, 1993).
This book brought the debate about the cultural turn to light in the Western
academic establishment. Many theorists attacked Fukuyama’s claims in many different
ways. Jacques Derrida critiqued the arguments using a Marxist framework. However, in
1993, Samuel Huntington sparked the debate even further by attacking Fukuyama’s basic
premise with his article in Foreign Affairs, entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?”
In this article, Huntington acknowledges that the Cold War changed the global
political environment and that, while nations will continue to be the principal focus of
relations (structure), culture and ideology will become the center points of conflict. In
other words, the clash is not over. As he puts it best in the introductory paragraph of his
article, “World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to
proliferate visions of what it will be—the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries
between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of
tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the
emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global
politics is likely to be in the coming years. It is my hypothesis that the fundamental
source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily
economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict
will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but
the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of
different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault
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lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington, 1993).
Another example of this cultural turn came in the writings of Joseph Nye. In 1990,
Nye wrote an article, published in Foreign Policy, called “Soft Power.” Nye argues that
there is a difference between hard power – that of military and economic power – and
soft power, which is defined as the ability to get other nations to do what you want,
because they want the same thing. Nye says that there are three ways to achieve results:
first with a big stick (threats), second with carrots (rewards), and finally is to “attract
them or co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to be
attracted to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks” (Nye,
2004). So, instead of the realist view of power, Nye proposes a much more constructivist
view of power as being that which will convince others that the goal is the same and to
work together for that goal. Cultural capital becomes much more important, as does
working toward universal goals.
This new way of looking at international relations and communication is much
more in line with UNESCO’s origins than ever before. Where before it was very difficult
to define universality, this new environment is becoming much more friendly to UN
initiatives that make universal claims, as seen by the Millenial Declaration of Human
Rights at the turn of the century. Nearly gone is the ideological struggle between
communism and democracy, replaced by ways to come to a common understanding,
which will help achieve peace. UNESCO is at the heart of this intellectual and practical
exercise.
Another practical example of culture coming to prominence in international
relations can be seen in former Director General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor’s

37

Foundation for a Culture of Peace (Cultura de Paz), based in Madrid.
According to the Cultura de Paz, a culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes and
behavior which reflect a respect for life, for human beings and for human dignity. At the
forefront of a culture of peace lie human rights, the rejection of all violence and
adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, solidarity and tolerance, as well as
promoting mutual understanding among all nations, groups and peoples. Abolishing
violence, according to Mayor, “requires much more than governmental action. Achieving
this objective requires the participation of everyone by implementing human rights in our
daily lives. Only then can we achieve a profound change in attitudes in our families, in
our communities, our regions and our countries” (Mayor, 2005).
In order to accomplish this goal, which equates to the attempt to bring together
various individuals with similar beliefs, Cultura de Paz proposes five things that must be
accomplished: 1) Promote education in peace, human rights and democracy, tolerance
and mutual understanding at both national and international levels; 2) Fight all forms of
discrimination; 3) Promote democratic principles and practices in all areas of society; 4)
Combat poverty and achieve sustainable participatory development which benefits all
people and provides each individual with the means for living life in dignity; 5)
“Mobilize society with a view to instilling in young people the fervent desire to seek
forms of coexistence based on conciliation, generosity and tolerance, as well as rejecting
all forms of oppression and violence and seeking a just distribution of resources and the
free-flow and sharing of information and knowledge” (Mayor, 2005).
Mayor also said that of late his foundation has been adding to its agenda by
attempting to promote the free circulation of information and knowledge and to fight
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terrorism (a rhetorical ploy that might appeal to some in the U.S.). This foundation thus
far is only present in Spain, but has been quite active in visiting other such organizations
globally. Interestingly, Mayor said some of his toughest battles for achieving a culture of
peace are being fought in his own country, where discrimination is proving difficult to
fight.
In this researcher’s interview with Mayor, it was perceived that Mayor had been
fed up with the bureaucracy of international governing bodies that never seem to
accomplish what needs to be done and are always subject to the whims of the member
states. Upon retiring from the bureaucratic life, Mayor resolved to do something more
tangible, and in his opinion, useful. He certainly has his work cut out for him. He finds
his organization underfunded and understaffed. He is virtually dependent on the funding
coming from city governments (notably the Madrid city council) to sustain operations.
But that contact with the governments is exactly the connection that can help bring about
his goals – if it lasts.
Such initiatives are gaining momentum on the international scene, of which
UNESCO is a part. In January of 2008, the government of Spain, led by President José
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, teamed up with the secretary-general of the U.N. to host a
conference of the Alliance of Civilizations. Mayor, and his Cultura de Paz were a part of
this conference and Mayor holds a spot on the “high level group” directing the actions.
This conference and initiative demonstrate the growing wave of post-structuralist thought
that believes that a new way to peace can be accomplished.
These examples of the cultural turn in international relations show much more
focus on the individual members of international organizations and governments, as
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opposed to the heavily resource and interest-based focus that has always been traditional
of international relations analysis and study. The turn towards a more important role for
culture and communication provides a natural bridge for cross-pollination with
communication scholars. It also provides a new way of looking at international
organizations that has not had much play in recent years, but that, given the importance
of what UNESCO does, could help us move much closer to true dialogue on important
cultural issues.
Specifically, the work done by constructivists in the field of international
relations, makes the concept of “norms” and their impact on international organizations
all the more important.
The “argumentative turn” in policy analysis
At the same time as the cultural turn was getting started in international relations,
many authors have pointed to an argumentative turn in the way organizations have
looked at their policy. In particular, organizations will strive to use rhetoric in framing
their policy that will convince others of the strength of their position. Ultimately, the goal
is to get the concepts described in rhetoric to be converted into norms or values that will
have an effect on actions (Crawford, 2002, Fischer, 1993, Payne, 2004).
Policy planning had previously been an exercise in power and resources, much
like the focus on international relations theory. However, numerous scholars have
described a change in this direction in a number of cases. Fischer (1993) describes a
change during the Great Society in which the policy-making power was concentrated into
the hands of the technocratic few. This has been described as an example of Technocratic
Theory, a variation of elite theory, in which the democratic deliberation has been taken
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out of the hands of the common people and placed into the hands of the technically
trained elite. This coincided with the decline of the political party in the U.S.
The conservative response to this was to obtain its own elite and politicize
through rhetoric, essentially divide, the technocratic elite and claim a piece of the pie
(Fischer, 1993). In this process is seen one example of the argumentative turn, which
pitted elite against elite for the prize of electoral clout. Fischer attributes the rise in
political fortunes of the conservative party in the 1908’s in part to this rhetorical strategy.
Another case to be used as an example of the argumentative turn can be found in
the same book by Fischer. In this example, Maaten Hajer further fleshes out the concept
of a discourse coalition, and uses the example of the struggle in Great Britain to “clean
up” polluting factory emissions. He points out that the rhetoric of the dominant coalition
placed a normative value cost versus benefit. In that light, until the rest of Europe,
clamoring for decrease in British emissions to slow down acid rain, could prove that the
available methods could prove: 1) causal harm to the environment; 2) that this harm
stemmed from emissions from British factories; and 3) that existing (and expensive)
methods for cleaning up emissions would make a substantial difference; the benefit did
not justify the cost (Hajer, 1993).
This type of rhetoric from a particular discourse coalition, made up mostly of
industrial owners, formed the dominant norm in that country. Going against that
normative belief by an opposed coalition took years of effort and research to overcome.
Although the desired policies were eventually adopted in Britain, remnants of the
previously dominant rhetoric are still present and hindering factors for the opposite
coalition (Hajer, 1993).
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Another example of research showing this argumentative turn can be found in
work being done by Céline Germond-Duret stemming from a paper as yet unpublished,
but peer-reviewed and presented at the International Studies Association Conference
(2009). Her work is based on the institutionalization of development discourse. She
argues that despite changes in development policy (particularly at the World Bank), key
elements of early rhetoric and argument persist to this day. The key elements that persist
despite policy changes are: 1) All societies tend to development on a linear way
(linearity); 2) Tradition conflicts with development (anti-tradition); 3) Development is
achievable through market economy and growth; and 4) Development is essentially
defined in economic terms (“economism”).
Germond-Duret argues that despite change in the policy at the World Bank, these
elements of rhetoric, formed in the 70’s and 80’s have been “naturalized in the
development discourse and practice,” to the point they have become norms and taken as
fact. The existence of these norms has created significant harm to the new direction being
taken by the World Bank.
This researcher would argue that the argumentative turn can also be seen in the
change in rhetoric and policy emanating from UNESCO after the departure of the U.S. It
also suggests that key elements of the change in rhetorical direction not only played a
role in the U.S. return (perhaps by making the return less threatening to the U.S., even if
some of the issues at the core of the U.S. withdrawal had not totally gone away), but are
becoming useful in furthering the goals of UNESCO’s foundational mandate of changing
the “minds of men.” This change presents great possibilities in the arena of cultural
diversity, mitigating certain types of conflict arising from the globalization process, and
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ultimately in improving communication between peoples of varying backgrounds.
Argumentation, norms and “the public” – linking communication and international
relations
If, as many believe, UNESCO’s rhetoric holds a great deal of power in the
construction of international norms, then it would be of great importance to establish the
identity of a public to which both sides (the U.S. and UNESCO) may be accountable.
Chapter 3 will propose that this public does indeed exist and Chapter 4 will analyze how
UNESCO’s argumentation tapped in to this public as a means of rhetorical coercion to
bring the U.S. back into membership.
A very fertile field for communication scholars for many centuries has been the
pursuit of the public sphere. Theorists have constantly grappled with the issue of what a
“public” is. This discussion has increased as technology and society have made changes.
Many theories exist on what a public is and how it is constituted. Since the German
philosopher Jurgen Habermas introduced the notion of the “public sphere” during the
1960’s in an attempt to describe the symbolic arena of politics and political conversations
that began with cultural institutions of the early eighteenth century, the “public sphere”
has become one of the most debated concepts in communication studies. The debate has
crossed the boundaries into rhetoric, politics, technology and many other fields of study.
The debate about the public sphere is diverse. It ranges from what elements should be
contained in the definition of the public, to whether or not the public must be active or
passive, to how it must be called into being.
For Habermas, the tension between the administrative power of the state, along
with its understanding of sovereignty, and the emerging organizations of the bourgeoisie,
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such as coffee houses, newspapers and literary culture, was seen as being mediated by the
public sphere as a symbolic site of deliberation and reasoning by the public. However, the
changes in society since the eighteenth century have called into question just how valid
Habermas’ framework really is. The growing tension between the interests of the state
and the international community, for one, has begun to change the framework on which
the modern state rests, as evidenced, for example, in the inclusion of non-state members
of certain international governing bodies (Microsoft and AT&T’s inclusion in the
International Telecommunications Union is a prime example). Many scholars, given the
complexity of the intellectual and politics environment that has shaped our world over the
last two centuries, have suggested that it is necessary to define the public sphere along the
lines of interaction between politics, technology, science, norms, culture and other
concepts. I would suggest that this is true and that these concepts are further complicated
by issues of cultural and historical identity.
Habermas has been joined by many other scholars in this philosophical debate
about the public. John Dewey, Hannah Arendt and many others have added much to the
discussion. Perhaps the single biggest area where debates about the public sphere can
influence and shape the field of international relations, in the opinion of this author,
occurs in the discussion of the creation of a cosmopolitan public sphere. History has been
replete with wars and cries for peace. Theorists have chimed in on the debate about how
to achieve peace for as long as history is recorded. In some way, international relations is
influenced by all these discussions. During the last century, these discussions have
included the effectiveness of international bodies, such as the United Nations and its
associated organizations, in accomplishing their mandates. Currently, there is enormous
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academic and political debate centered around the concepts of knowledge and
information flow. At the heart of this debate lies policy on intellectual property and
cultural diversity. UNESCO is at the heart of this debate – a fact that makes study of its
direction regarding member states even more relevant.
James Bohman (1997) is one author who poses the idea of a cosmopolitan public
sphere. He uses Kant’s theoretical framework of a “negative substitute” for a world
republic dedicated to upholding the common good. Kant said that it is up to individual
political actors to stand up and uphold or create favorable conditions for peace. He said
that this was a more achievable result than the ideal of a benevolent world republic. As a
result, Kant claims that a federation of states must emerge – each driven by its population
consisting of actors standing up for common good. This public opinion would have to
influence actions of the federation. Bohman argues that this power of the cosmopolitan
public sphere can “shape and ultimately reorganize existing republican institutions and
political identities.”
While Bohman’s ultimate goal is in determining a public is to promote democratic
deliberation, he rightly points out that International civil society is not enough to achieve
this goal because it is “too punctual and too divided spatially and temporally to effect
decisions.” Bohman says a cosmopolitan public sphere could influence deliberation in
existing institutions and that these institutions could organize public opinion
internationally. The resulting discourse can only help international organizations to in a
quest promote peace. This perspective is considered a constructivist approach by those in
the field of international relations, but the study of the public is a path well-known by
communication scholars.
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This discussion is intended as background and a review of the field, as the work
of this dissertation is intended to bring to the table the best of both communication
scholarship and international relations scholarship. While much of the literature cited has
shed light on, and guided the research in this dissertation, I have chosen a specific
methodological framework, which I believe brings together both fields in a manner that
has only recently appeared in the literature – and much of that has had little to do with
international organizations (and none to do with UNESCO specifically). I believe that
combining these fields in this way opens up new areas of useful research that may bear
fruit for years to come. I also believe it essential to examine the ideological power
international organizations can have on the political makeup of the world (for good and,
perhaps, for bad). The following chapters will address issues of methodology and
analysis related to this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
The previous chapters have traced the literature related to the study of
international relations, international communication, and specifically, UNESCO. While
all of these topics are related at some level, it is at the methodological level that research
lines can truly intersect. It is also at this level that the biggest void in research can be
found, making an argumentation analysis of UNESCO’s rhetoric a valuable addition to
the body of scholarly work. The dissertation will use an informal argumentation analysis
to look at how the rhetoric changed at UNESCO following the departure of the U.S. in
1984. By informal I simply mean to distinguish what follows from the formal categories
of logical analysis characteristic of certain philosophical practice, and to follow the lead
of scholars like Toulmin and Perelman in their effort to track argument in everyday and
semi-formal usage.
Immediately after the U.S. departure from UNESCO, one can see three distinct
categories of rhetorical argumentation emerging from the agency. First was a phase of
denial, in which UNESCO claimed it was continuing on with its foundational mandate
with or without the U.S. presence. This position denounced the U.S. as a bully who takes
his toys and runs home when he can no longer have his way. This hard line gave way
rather quickly to an abrupt change in rhetoric in 1987 with the change of directors
general.
This second phase of rhetorical argumentation can be characterized by
expressions of sadness and regret that such a powerful nation would not be involved at
the table of the forum of ideas that is UNESCO. During this period, every effort was
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made to portray an environment of change in management practices, and most
importantly in ideological direction. Focus drifted from politicized issues to ones more
directly centered around the foundational mandate of UNESCO. For the most part,
education and science initiatives at UNESCO remained unchanged. The real change came
in an increased vigor in pursuing cultural goals such as the Convention on Cultural
Diversity and collaboration with the UN on the Millennial Declaration of Human Rights,
among many others. During this time, UNESCO collaborated with other international
organizations, such as the ITU and WTO to organize initiatives.
The final category of rhetorical argumentation is less pronounced, but came
during a period of time starting roughly in the year 2000. Spurred by the next change in
directors general at UNESCO, this era can be categorized as one focused on
demonstrating improvement in management practices within UNESCO. The focus of this
period was to convince the U.S. that budgetary improprieties had diminished and that the
organization was under better management. Although the rhetoric of this period was
influential in the ultimate decision of the U.S. to return to membership, I argue that the
lasting rhetoric from the previous period (which continues even to this day) was even
more influential.
Perelman and the Typologies of Informal Argumentation
In order to evaluate the argumentation methods used by UNESCO, I utilize an
informal analysis that follows the lead established in Chaim Perelman’s typology of
argumentation schemes.
Chaim Perelman, the polish-born philosopher of law, is most known for teaming
up with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in authoring the book The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
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Argumentation. This work is largely considered one of the most important works in
rhetorical theory of the twentieth century.
Perelman began his career intrigued by the concept of justice. Likely influenced
by historical events taking place in Europe in the 1920’s and 1930’s, as well as his
intellectual formation, which included an earned doctorate in law, he began to see that
applications of the law always involved value judgments. This presented a concern for
him since values cannot be placed under the microscope of logical reason. While one
might conclude from this that that justice must be arbitrary, Perelman rejected this
reasoning and continued his research on the interplay between justice, values and reason.
When Perelman met Olbrechts-Tyteca, they teamed up to conduct an extensive
study of the ways authors in various fields of study used argumentation to come to terms
with values. They examined statements from judges that explained the reasons for their
decisions as well as other fields that involved deliberations about matters of value. The
result was a new scheme based on the Aristotelian concept of analytics, which dealt with
dialectical reasoning as opposed to demonstrative reasoning.
Perelman believed that argumentation is distinct from formal logic or reasoning in
that it is the study of discursive techniques that “induce or increase the mind’s adherence
to the theses presented for its assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968), whereas
logic, or demonstration, is simply a calculation based on rules that have been previously
established. Through this scheme, values and judgment can be understood as operating in
harmony and then be explained. Logic is impersonal, whereas argumentation is peoplecentered and affected by hierarchies of values. Thus, for persuasion to take place there
must be a meeting of the minds.
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This worldview offers a compelling parallel to the points of contention that
separate traditional IR scholars (who value the material, logical as explanatory elements),
from constructivists (who don’t dispute the value of the material power, yet see a high
value in the social, or people-centered variables as explanatory elements).
At the center of Perelman’s concept of argumentation is the audience, which he
breaks into a universal audience and a particular audience. He argues that for
argumentation to occur there must be some sort of “meeting of the minds.” In this
intellectual engagement, a common frame of reference must be shared. Perelman defines
the audience “for the purpose of rhetoric, as the ensemble of those whom the speaker
wishes to influence by his argumentation” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968). Thus,
the audience is the speaker’s conception of the audience, a kind of mental projection, as
opposed to a physical, concrete and tangible public. This concept is of importance in the
case of UNESCO, because much of the rhetoric used is not directed at specific audiences,
as opposed to a more general imagined audience defined by the organization.
For Perelman, the universal audience is very generic, a thought experiment
composed of all reasonable people. The particular audience is a more specific group of
people – who may or may not be reasonable or inclined to believe the speaker. In one
possible scenario, the speaker may be trying to persuade a specific audience (such as the
government of the U.S.) by selecting appeals that appeal to both the universal audience
(the international community) and the specific audience.
This concept of a universal audience has been discussed from both sides in the
forum of academic scholarship, but I find it very useful in constructing a scheme that
would help explain the U.S. return to UNESCO from a different perspective than those
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traditional IR scholars who explain the U.S. return as nothing more than a reflection of
perceived national interest. Such an explanation is short-sighted in that it belittles the
potential value of UNESCO and the U.S. membership in this international forum and
downplays the likely role suasory argument may have played in the calculation of costs
and benefits.
Aside from the audience, Perelman categorizes the rhetorical means by which
speakers can persuade their audiences. He starts by explaining that fact and truth can only
be defined as something to which the universal audience agrees with. Hence, the starting
point for his scheme begins with values (and a hierarchy of homogeneous and
heterogeneous values) and loci, or topics. The speaker then selects these elements on
which to focus, creating what Perelman calls a “presence,” or even an absence of
presence (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968). Ultimately, the goal of the speaker is to
establish “communion” with the audience.
At this point, Perelman elaborates the techniques of argumentation. He argues that
there are two main techniques – those of association and those of dissociation. With
arguments of association, the speaker seeks to create a bond between the starting point of
the argument and the point being argued (what he wishes to make persuasive). With
arguments of dissociation, he seeks to distance himself from the starting point. The
speaker may try to split an idea in two in order to shed association to undesirable
elements of that idea.
For this dissertation, I argue that UNESCO used a combination of quasi-logical
arguments (which Perelman says is an element of argumentation by association) to
associate itself with elements of its foundational mandate, with argumentation by
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dissociation then undertaken to distance itself from the charged themes of NWICO and
from accusations of mismanagement. Most importantly, in the process, UNESCO was
attempting to attach itself to norms it began to establish when it was created and use the
rhetorical power it had to move these norms closer to universality. With the charged
atmosphere of the Cold War faded into history, many of the foundational mandates had
gotten serious traction in the international community.
Argumentation and the Logical Schemes of international relations
Perelman's schematic approach to the analysis of argumentative formations is
well aligned with the method of analysis used by Neta Crawford. In Argument and
Change in World Politics (2002), Crawford evaluated the mechanisms of evidence and
warrant used to establish intersubjectively validated norms in the process of
decolonization and humanitarian intervention. Crawford maps out a process she claims is
commonly used by those presenting arguments to change the ethical norms associated
with decolonization.
Crawford’s book, targeted to scholars of international relations, is an attempt to
bring the strengths of communication scholarship into the realm of world politics. As
previously noted, constructivists in IR have begun to push the scholarship of their field,
recognizing what rhetorical scholars have known for some time – that what is political
can be constituted by how we communicate. How communicate helps to shape norms.
Norms then help shape politics and can be very explanatory when it comes to political
policy and decisions. This is the very thing realists and liberalists in IR have rejected
because of the long-held belief that norms, culture and discourse hold no real power –
they only reflect material power.
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Crawford does an admirable job of tracing the history of slavery and colonization
and establishing credible evidence that changing norms played a much greater role in
their demise than IR scholars have previously given credit. She lays out a history in
which transnational advocates mobilized to start norm revolutions that eventually tore
down the regimes that supported slavery and colonialism. Advocate groups used their
audience’s own ethical norms against them to make it unacceptable to continue to support
the practices of slavery and forced labor.
Crawford breaks down the discourse used to support the regimes of slavery and
colonialism and shows how advocate groups began to use argumentation found in long
established norms to delegitimize the undesirable, yet prevalent practices. Although it
took many years of work, the argument against slavery and forced labor began to gain
traction (after shifting from the American Indian to Africans). Her work represents one of
the best recent attempts to show cross-pollination of scholarly fields. The work of this
dissertation is one more step in that direction – this time using UNESCO as a case study.
But Crawford is not the only one who has used Perelman’s schemes of
argumentation. It appears to be the most closely related to the topic of this dissertation,
but others have used the techniques in studies of similar international importance. Frank
Myers (2000) used a similar analysis to examine the famous “Winds of Change” speech
by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1960. That speech marked a distinct
change in policy for the British government. For more than 100 years, Britain had pursed
a policy of white, European domination over the politics of its colonies in Africa. This
speech signaled a change in direction from that policy and distinctly went against the
policy of the British Conservative Party.

53

The focus of Myers’ research is to show how the chosen speech was able to
balance between three audiences: 1) the group of people who supported the policy that is
being changed (as well as the leadership which previously carried out the old policy) and
will likely feel betrayed at the changed; 2) those who were not supporters of the old
policy but will probably support the new one; and 3) those who have supported the leader
in the past and also support the changes. The political challenge in the change of policy is
to rally the enthusiastic support of the third group, minimize the feelings of betrayal from
the first group, and assuage any suspicions from the second group about the motives for
the change (Myers, 2000).
Although Myers’ study was particularly useful in evaluating the use of various
argumentative techniques on disparate audiences, as well as showing the background of
how audience beliefs came in the construction of the speech, other studies have placed
focus on other relevant aspects of Perelman’s New Rhetoric. Ira Strauber (1985) focused
the bulk of his work on the interplay between reasonable and rational. He derives a
significant portion of his analysis from Perelman’s concept of lies, versus truth. Although
he departs somewhat from Perelman in that he argues that reasonable ought to be the
controlling factor over the rational (whereas Perelman argues that the reasonable should
control, but only as a step toward a more solid rational), the article does make a
significant step into showing why rhetoric and argumentation should play a greater role
in explaining political policy (Strauber, 1986).
Perelman, Crawford, and the Unfolding UNESCO Situation
In her book, Crawford maps three phases in which argumentation runs its course
in the changing of global norms. In the first phase identified by Crawford, argumentation
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deconstructs and delegitimizes or denormalizes dominant beliefs and practices. In this
phase, as applied to the UNESCO history under analysis here, UNESCO can be described
as using argumentation to deconstruct its previous association with NWICO, particularly
some of its more controversial practical applications, such as the licensure of journalists.
In the second phase persuasive arguments are posited that reconstruct
argumentation based on an alternative that meets normative criteria. In this phase, the
organization begins to rhetorically embrace an alternate course of action and policy
begins to take shape. I argue that this corresponds to the phase in which UNESCO used
quasi-logical argumentation to establish itself as the best forum for discussing ideological
issues of culture and diversity and for bringing people together from various backgrounds
to form a common goal.
The third phase suggested by Crawford occurs when actors begin to take action
upon the new argued norm. She says that if arguments are persuasive enough, then the
balance of capabilities between the previously dominant norm and the newly suggested
normative belief will begin to change. In this phase, I suggest that UNESCO undertook
an agenda to aggressively bring people and nations together to act upon its foundational
mandate. I also argue that this is the phase in which UNESCO currently finds itself. The
argumentation tactics used by UNESCO during this time gained enough of a following
that the U.S. found it necessary to re-evaluate its position as a non-member.
However, in using these forms of analysis, we run in to some of the same
problems outlined earlier in the field of international relations. Communications scholars
and constructivists in the field of international relations will all recognize the value of
argumentation and rhetoric in research in their respective fields. However, many
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international relations scholars from the liberalist or realist tradition continue to treat
rhetoric and argumentation as if they held little explanatory value to their field. This is
problematic, since we are studying an international organization that holds value in the
eyes of the world in many different arenas, and an unsatisfying disregard especially given
cases (such as presented by the work of international organizations) where the main
institutional power is suasory (as opposed to that implemented by armies or control over
the economic levers of state power). Realists and liberalists would both argue that
material power, not rhetorical positioning and argumentation, played the biggest role in
the United States’ return to membership in UNESCO. They would say that the U.S.
returned because it was in their national interest to return – that they had something to
gain from returning.
My problem with this reasoning is that it completely fails to take in to account the
social power the rest of the world has upon the nations who deviate from norms
established by the international community. Can it be proven that the U.S. had something
to gain from returning? Certainly. But can it be established that what it stood to gain was
the causal reason behind the decision to return? I argue that trying to establish that link is
complicated at best and that communication scholars with long-established research in
the power of discourse have much to add to an explanatory discussion on the U.S. return.
Crawford pointed out in her own case study that some have argued slavery was abolished
for economic reasons. Yet her case adds a refreshing new light in the field and is a
compelling argument for the power of discourse.
Had any previous studies on UNESCO’s rhetoric been performed, constructivists
might already have noted that the argumentation used by UNESCO was successful in
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convincing the U.S. that a return to membership was in its best national interest and that
the world’s interest would also be served. But this view is also too simple. It is virtually
impossible to prove that American decision-makers were finally persuaded by
UNESCO’s rhetoric that the right changes had been made and that all problem areas had
been resolved. Indeed, even right up to the date of return, and even afterwards, many
political analysts – especially Republicans – were still saying that the time was not right
for return – and that the true issues which caused the U.S. to withdraw had not been
resolved satisfactorily. “President Bush should not yield to pressure to rejoin UNESCO,
even if it appears to be an attractive low-cost way to deflect international charges of
isolationism or to deflate pressure to pay U.S. arrears to the United Nations without
assurances of reform. The President should instead take time to evaluate UNESCO's
current priorities and progress toward reform” (Schaefer, 2001).
A new thread of scholarship has recently emerged that aims to bridge the gap
between those who foreground rhetoric (constructivists and communications scholars) as
opposed to those who put a premium on material power (liberalists and realists). As with
any model, some elements are acceptable and others less so, but the work of Ronald
Krebs and Patrick Jackson (2007) does suggest a potentially promising path forward.
They have recently proposed a model for looking at the power of argumentation and
political rhetoric and, although they apply this model only to smaller scale politics, it is
based on Perelman’s theory and the stages proposed by Crawford. They call this a model
of rhetorical coercion.
Krebs and Jackson rightly point out that it is impossible to establish that
persuasion occurs as a causal effect of argumentation, even in light of policy changes
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suggesting persuasion has been successful. How can we be sure that change was
motivated by one side becoming convinced of the validity of the argumentation framed
by the opposition? Even organizations that have changed their stance may not have done
so because the true convictions of those involved have been modified (their motives may
be cynical or self-serving in other ways). In the case of UNESCO, although the
Republican administration of George Bush returned the U.S. to membership in 2003,
saying in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, “This organization has been
reformed, and America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights,
tolerance, and learning” (Bush, 2003), his own party seemed yet unpersuaded and many
other national conservative leaders would more likely have endorsed the exactly opposed
view.
The model of rhetorical coercion accounts for this deficiency by dismissing
entirely the question of whether or not persuasion actually happened. This question may
be relevant, but is not necessary when it comes to explaining change in policy. In the
Krebs and Jackson model, three parties are involved: a claimant making a claim through
argumentation, an opposition to the claimant, and a public to whom both parties are
somehow accountable. All three of these parties must be involved for the model to
function (Krebs, 2007). “Coercion” is a term found much more palatable to mainstream
IR scholars because it implies real leverage – something realists and liberalists can truly
understand and accept.
In the model of rhetorical coercion, Krebs uses the example of the Druze Arabs in
Israel and their use of rhetoric to coerce the Israeli government into granting them rights
not held by other Arabs. In terms of material power, the Druze held very little, and the
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government was not naturally inclined to grant them the rights they sought. Their position
was thus to deny these rights to all Arabs. The various Christian, Muslim and other
groups of Arabs employed a range of tactics as they fought for the extension of rights.
Other Arab groups had more resources than the Druze. Yet only the Druze have been
successful in persuading Israel to guarantee them rights. In this case, the claimants were
the Druze. The opposition was the Israeli government. The public that held some sort of
power was the citizens of the Israeli state.
Culture and norms play a part in this model in that the public holds given values
and positions likely to be accepted or at least understood based on culture. In this case,
the Druze appealed to a highly shared cultural belief that if one wanted rights as a citizen,
he or she must be willing to serve in the military to fight for them. The Druze were the
only Arab group to embrace mandatory military service even as they lacked full rights as
citizens. Later, this was rhetorically constructed to appeal to the values held by Israeli
citizens. As far as this key public was concerned, the Druze had met their obligation and
deserved the right to be represented as citizens. The opposition had little choice but to
grant the Druze their demands (ibid). Krebs points out that the government likely had
little desire to do so, but was left with the choice of attempting to frame the argument
differently (and under conditions where alternative frames would have been decisively
unflattering to the national government), or redefine the implications involved. Even
traditional IR scholars would see that there was real power in this tactic.
For this model to be effective, one key component is the presence of a public able
to exert influence over its opposition. The authors point out that this fact often limits the
range of achievable action (and by extension, the reach of the model). But despite this
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potential limitation, other studies have also shown the usefulness of this model on the
international stage. Some of the contexts in which this model can be successfully applied
include the eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO (Firke and Wiener,
1999; Schimmelfenig, 2004), the analysis of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and his
proposals for nuclear disarmament (Evangelista, 2001), Cold War crisis negotiation
(Mattern, 2004), and even dynamics in play between Arab groups (Barnett, 1998).
This model suggests an effective method for explaining the U.S. return to
UNESCO, despite many claims that the organization had insufficiently changed its
practices during the time of the American absence. In applying this model, the claimant
would be UNESCO itself seeking to coerce the U.S. into returning. The opposition would
be the U.S. government. But who was the public for this persuasive exchange? I suggest
that given the absence of Cold War polarization dynamics (changes which took place
after the U.S. departure), a significant turn in direction – at least rhetorically – had been
accomplished with respect to the international ways in which universal human rights and
intercultural dialog were conducted. This evolution has softened the tendency to view
UNESCO as a battleground for the Cold War and has invigorated the push towards
UNESCO’s original mission as a forum organization. The result is a significant
international community, a transnational public, as it were, that sees value in UNESCO's
work in the world (at least as it was originally articulated). Hence, the public to which
the U.S. (as opposition in this model) feels pressure is the international community itself.
It must be pointed out that this public is not ever-present, or always salient when
international disagreement arises. Nor do all international organizational controversies
interpellate the same transnational public; rather, it is the specific foundational mandate
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of UNESCO – and the recent push towards these goals in the absence of the Cold War –
that has resulted in the formation of this public.
In what follows, then, I utilize this model because of its potential viability to
constructivists and communication scholars given the way in which it more adequately
weights the value of norms and rhetorical leverage. It is tolerable to traditional IR
scholars because it stops short of claiming persuasion and speaks in terms of real leverage
and power – albeit rhetorical. In short, this model accounts for the material power of
rhetoric without claiming persuasion as a causal force in determining policy. Applied in
this case, the model is able to help explain the return of the U.S. to UNESCO in terms
that both sides should be able to find palatable.
This dissertation thus seeks to contribute to the field by showing how the
rhetorical positioning accomplished by UNESCO anticipated responses by other member
states, although not necessarily with a view to proving a causal relationship between
UNESCO's public arguments and state interactions (although implying such a relation
may not finally be seen as unreasonable given the public ways the fate of American
involvement in UNESCO were litigated).
In line with this perspective, UNESCO documents have been analyzed to locate
with greater precision the strategies of argumentation. Specifically, the dissertation
establishes UNESCO as the claimant seeking to coerce the U.S. to return to membership,
the United States as the opposition, and establishes the international community as the
public. The next chapter examines those normative beliefs UNESCO sought to strengthen
or downplay from the time period beginning when the Americans withdrew support. The
findings reported derive from a combination of depth interviews with current and
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previous UNESCO officials, including former UNESCO Director General, Federico
Mayor, and archival research at UNESCO archives in Paris, France. Documents reviewed
include: Executive Board meeting minutes, official declarations ratified by UNESCO,
communication between the UNESCO directors general and some foreign government
officials, speeches (particularly prominent ones) given by UNESCO directors general,
and UNESCO publications. The time period analyzed has been intentionally held flexible
to account for each of the three periods suggested earlier, but mainly focuses on the
period immediately following the U.S. withdrawal and the tenure of Mayor as director
general. Appropriate attention will be placed on the period preceding the U.S. return,
however it is expected that the most descriptive results will come during the time of its
absence, especially immediately following U.S. withdrawal.
In order to guide my analysis of the UNESCO documents and the interviews, and
in accordance with the model suggested by previous scholars, the following questions
were used as roadmaps. 1) Are the arguments used in the document making use of
concrete supporting material, or are they mostly assertive? 2) What kinds of
argumentative evidence does the document/speaker use and are they consistent? 3)
Which arguments are given plenty of support and which ones are left short, and why? 4)
Does the document refer directly to the U.S. absence, or does it just present the
arguments, leaving it up to the audience to connect the dots? 5) What evidence in the
document points to arguments directly associated with the U.S. departure? 6) To which
audience(s) does this document appear to be directed based on the evidence included?
For the purpose of categorizing arguments and clarification devices found in the
documents, I have used a standard classification of rhetorical evidence and reasoning,
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including serial examples, extended examples, quantification, isolated comparisons,
extended comparisons, testimony, definition and contrast (Hart, 1997).
The bulk of this dissertation is based upon evaluation of speeches and the minutes
from Executive Board meetings held at UNESCO Headquarters. These documents were
obtained during a visit to UNESCO archives in Paris during July and August of 2009.
Previous contact I made with Mayor was able to get me in touch with the Chief Archivist
at UNESCO headquarters, Jens Boel. Through Boel, I was able to secure entrance into
the archives. While in the archives, I had nearly unrestricted access to materials contained
therein. One restriction was a firm rule that certain sensitive documents were off-limits to
anyone for a period of 20 years. Executive Board minutes are considered sensitive
documents, but since the minutes I was looking for took place in 1985-1989, the 20-year
time frame had elapsed on all of the documents. Therefore, it was a simple matter of
formally requesting the documents and I was able to gain access – usually in the same
day.
While at UNESCO archives, I was given use of photocopy machines to duplicate
any documents I retrieved. So the process was quite simple. I would tell the archivist the
documents and dates I wanted. He would bring the documents, which I read over and
photocopied, then returned. The access granted while there was really quite amazing,
aside from the 20-year rule. I was able to recover the transcripts from the speeches I
needed. I also recovered minutes from Executive Board meetings held in September and
October of 1986 and 1987. Also in the archives I was able to find reports given to
UNESCO from both the U.S. and U.K. about evaluations both countries had performed
on UNESCO. Related to these reports, I was able to copy letters and correspondence
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between the Director General and foreign government officials. All documents were
photocopied and brought back with me for analysis. I maintained contact with the
archivist there in case any documents were missed. They expressed a willingness to scan
and email any documents I might have need of in the future. All documents were
available in English, French and Spanish.
Perhaps given my training as a journalist, I value the depth interview as a means
of providing color to this research. In fact, the selection of this topic was in no small part
due to an interview I conducted with Mayor in 2005. I interviewed him in August, 2005
for a project that would later evolve into this dissertation. I made an appointment and
traveled to Madrid, Spain to do this interview at Mayor’s Foundation for a Culture of
Peace headquarters. I tape recorded the interview and transcribed it for analysis. The
interviews with Mayor were conducted in Spanish (I have tested at a level near native
speaker in written and spoken Spanish) and I translated the interview into English.
As this project evolved, I followed up this interview with a telephone interview in
November of 2007. Again the interview was in Spanish and recorded, transcribed and
translated. Finally, in August of 2009, I again traveled to Madrid following my research
in the archives to conduct one final interview. The same procedures were followed in this
interview.
The other depth interviews were conducted in Paris. At UNESCO headquarters on
July 31, 2009, I was able to interview one archivist, Alexandre Coutelle, who had been
present through the tenures of both Mayor and Matsuura. I also conducted two other
interviews with UNESCO officials which were not used in this dissertation, but were
nonetheless quite interesting and enlightening. I conducted all in-depth interviews, and
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this meant that most interviews with UNESCO officials were conducted in English –
since my French proficiency is minimal. This presented minimal communication
challenge as all of the people interviewed were quite proficient in English. The interviews
were taped and transcribed.
One principal reason this research is so timely is that UNESCO is now facing a
moment of transition where a new Director General might be elected. If, as hypothesized,
the particular flair and rhetoric of each director general has such a profound effect on the
direction of the organization, an analysis of how entrenched towards institutionalization
the current argumentation has evolved into norms will be very valuable should someone
with a different ideological orientation take the reins of UNESCO – a distinct possibility.
In addition, it will become interesting to see how the arguments used to coerce the U.S.
into a return will play out in actual policy and discussion over the coming years.
Most importantly, this research could help to invigorate the cross-pollination
between communication scholars and IR scholars and give added importance to the value
of rhetoric in the arena of international politics.
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CHAPTER 4
Analysis
This year marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which
changed the entire world and set free the minds of millions of men and
women. I strongly hope that this spirit will guide our efforts here, at
UNESCO, towards the creation of more just and prosperous societies based
on knowledge, tolerance and equal opportunities for all through education,
science, culture and access to information. My understanding of a NEW
HUMANISM for the 21st century will guide all my activity (Bokova,
2009).
This quotation, taken from the mission statement of newly-elected Director
General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, represents a stark change from the rhetoricallycharged days of the NWICO conflict. It is but a small sample of the monumental change
in rhetorical direction the organization while the United States was still refusing to
participate as a member. It is also a sign that this new rhetorical direction has become
entrenched in the community surrounding UNESCO – that those associated with the
organization have bought in to the new direction. The policies and programs UNESCO
has been pursuing in recent years provide confirmatory arguments in support of this
statement (consider, for example, the Millennium Development Goals, among other
policies). UNESCO has not always followed this path – in fact, far from it. And so the
question arises: how did UNESCO public discourse reach this juncture? In what
follows, I use the UNESCO history to lay out the contours of a paradigm case for how
argumentation can change policy and influence the decisions of even the largest of states
– in this case, the United States.
This chapter will examine the process by which the United States returned to
membership in UNESCO, imagining its logical unfolding as the elaboration of an
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ongoing public argument. UNESCO used techniques associated with argumentation to
“coerce” the U.S. back into membership. I use the word coerce, because, as mentioned in
Chapter 3, the arguments used by UNESCO discursively positioned both itself and the
U.S., leaving the United States few acceptable public options apart from returning to
membership.
There is a corollary communication theory, which is widely used, called
“framing.” This theory says that framing is used to encourage an audience to see the
world in a different way. By inducing audiences to see a phenomenon through a
particular perspective, a frame leads readers to focus on some attributes of a circumstance
and overlook others, thus strongly shaping their subsequent responses (Entman, 1993).
The theory is quite complex, but simply used in this example, says that UNESCO framed
the discussion about itself in such a way that put NWICO and the budgetary concerns
into the background and the common values upon which it was founded into the
foreground.
In the example used by Krebs in the previous chapter, the Druze Arabs in Israel
used the norms established by the Israeli government itself to frame their argument. The
Israeli government had long attached the rights to full citizenship to service in the armed
forces. The Druze served in the military, and so they framed their argument upon this
norm – demanding full rights of citizenship. Although the Israeli government was not
keen to give these rights, they had few acceptable options but to give in to the Druze
demands. Framing and argumentation established the position necessary to accomplish
such an outcome.
With UNESCO – like the Druze example – the U.S. had established that
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UNESCO had departed from the values and direction upon which it was founded,
becoming too politicized in the process. It also complained about the budgetary decisions
made (nothing new to U.N. organizations). UNESCO framed the discussion to eliminate
the controversial elements and embrace its foundational values, leaving the U.S. with few
acceptable reasons to remain on the outside. The presence of an apparently unified
international community behind UNESCO’s goals, added real weight to the pressure on
the U.S. to return.
With such a framework to the analysis, the return can be explained in terms that
should be found acceptable to traditional scholars of international relations who see the
world through a materialist lens, but that may also strike a chord with communication
scholars and constructivist scholars in the IR field more inclined to privilege explanations
of social change residing in the social and rhetorical.
In what follows, then, I examine the development of UNESCO’s argumentation
through the three phases suggested by Crawford. Particular emphasis must be placed in
the first phase, as this is where the argumentation first begins to dissociate UNESCO
from previous policy and reattach itself (or, to use the Perelman vernacular, associate)
with its foundational mandate. However, in order to completely paint the picture of just
how drastically UNESCO changed direction following the U.S. departure, I begin with an
evaluation of the state in which UNESCO found itself in the immediate aftermath of the
U.S. withdrawal, building on the very high quality account given by Clare Wells (Wells,
1987).
UNESCO after U.S. Withdrawal
As mentioned in Chapter 1, NWICO was the outcome of an ideological battle that
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started shortly after the end of World War II, when UNESCO was formed. At that time,
many of it’s founders envisioned UNESCO as a forum organization designed to get
nations from varying backgrounds to come together and discuss matters that could impact
“the minds of men.” They were excited about education and culture being included for
the first time on an international basis (Huxley, 1947). In part because of this
foundational interest, considerable work was spent defining and articulating the
UNESCO ideology. Yet even from the beginning, it was clear that the nations of the
world did not agreeably share the same vision of what UNESCO was to accomplish
(Wells, 1987).
For the U.S. and many of its allies, the organization was seen and used as a
functional tool to combat the ideologies it found distasteful, or that it felt could lead to a
recurrence of the previous global wars. Thus, it was seen and used as a weapon against
communism from the very beginnings of the Cold War (Sewell, 1975). This vision as it
emerged in the 1950's and 1960's was so distinct from the original mssion the
organization's founders had in mind, that a handful of UNESCO officials acted on their
accumulating sense of disillusionment and stepped down over the years (Senarclens,
1985).
As the Cold War faded into the annals of history, what remained was a world
lacking the institutionalized dichotomy of superpowers who fought, bribed, and cajoled
to secure the loyalty of the developing nations. Those nations now formed a new majority
in UNESCO and began to flex their collective muscles, in part by forming NWICO. But
the departure of the U.S. from UNESCO (the United States was joined by the U.K. and
Singapore) did not change the larger dynamics still at work in the world. Many
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developing nations felt they could best advance their interests by pursuing every avenue
they could find to achieve a more even footing with developed nations. The UNESCO
Director General at the time the U.S. left, Amadou M’Bow, was from Senegal and had
been a champion of NWICO from the very beginning. With the U.S. and the U.K. gone, a
time of uncertainty was upon UNESCO and the membership was waiting to see what
course would be taken (Mayor, Former Director General of UNESCO, 2007).
The course taken was to march forward in the same manner as before. To M’Bow,
the loss of the U.S. would certainly mean budgetary shortfalls, which would impact the
programs at UNESCO, but this would “not be enough to stop the progress of this great
organization.” (M'Bow, 1985) In his speech to the annual general conference of
UNESCO, M’Bow acknowledged that cuts would have to be made, but gave detailed
accounts of how the programs UNESCO had previously supported would continue with
or without the support of the U.S.
It goes without saying that some of these difficulties (budgetary shortfalls
explained previously in some detail) are directly connected with the
situation created by the withdrawal of the United States of America from
the Organization. The budgetary difficulties experienced by the
Organization in 1985 have been a factor in delaying the application of
various measures or in masking the real effectiveness of what has been
done. The serious budgetary cutbacks to which the programme and the
staff will be subjected in 1986-1987 will make it necessary to introduce
further stringent measures. But this will not stop the mission UNESCO has
set out to achieve. This Organization will continue to champion the causes
beneficial to all member nations regardless of their size (M'Bow, 1985).
Numerous documents affirm the continuation of direction UNESCO and its
Director General had been pursuing. In fact, at this point in history, faced with the U.S.
withdrawal, UNESCO really had few available directions to pursue. It could try to paint
itself as an organization willing to make any changes necessary to stop the U.S. from
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withdrawing. It could continue unabashed with its current policy and engage in a spitting
match (so to speak) with the U.S., defending itself at all costs against the perceived bully.
Or, finally, it might pursue something of a middle ground: express regret at the departure
of the U.S., distance the organization from charged topics, admit improvements needed to
be made and promise to deliver more defensible programmatic outcomes.
Although the third option was finally pursued, I note that the argumentative
change in UNESCO strategy only occurred after a change of Director General (consistent
with the logic I elaborated in mapping UNESCO history onto Crawford first phase). In
reality, this option may (arguably) have been the only one able to save UNESCO from
elimination as a United Nations agency. But in the immediate wake of the U.S.
departure, M’Bow rather chose to adopt the second option.
Privately, behind closed doors in the executive board meetings of UNESCO,
M’Bow lambasted the U.S. decision and vigorously defended himself and the
organization he directed. Publicly, before the general assembly of UNESCO, M’Bow,
representing the decisions made by the executive board, drew upon every resource to
defend UNESCO and cast U.S. officials in a harsh light. Some of the language used in
these documents shows clearly UNESCO’s intention to hold persist in its course – despite
charges of politicization and budgetary mismanagement.
In the executive board meeting minutes, which only recently were opened for
academic and public inspection (following UNESCO’s mandatory policy of a 20-year
period of closed files), M’Bow offered a detailed accounting of the details surrounding
the U.S. decision to withdraw. He assured all members of the board that he had done
everything possible to convince the U.S. to remain and continue paying its share of the
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UNESCO budget (which represented one-fourth of the whole budget). It is noteworthy
that much discussion revolved around the money lost by a U.S. withdrawal (UNESCO
Executive Board, 1984). Although the U.S. gave proper notice of its intention to
withdraw effective December 31, 1984, the question was whether the U.S. (whose
withdrawal came at the end of the first half of the 1984-1985 biennium) did or did not
owe the second half of its contribution for that biennium. The board concluded that the
U.S. did indeed owe UNESCO $43 million. A decision was made to pursue this amount.
The U.S. refused to pay, and discussion was later held in the 121st session of the
Executive Board regarding bringing the matter of the money owed to the attention of the
International Court of Justice (UNESCO Executive Board, 1985). Nothing ever came of
this and UNESCO never collected this money.
Also part of the discussion in the Executive Board was a plan brought up by
M’Bow himself, and endorsed by the board, that would have member nations voluntarily
forgo surpluses under Part VII of the budget for 1981-1983 that were due them as a result
of the rise in value of the dollar (UNESCO Executive Board, 1985). Discussion centered
on whether such a plan would allow UNESCO to stand tall and credibly claim that its
goals would not be thwarted when even several large nations decided not to participate.
M’Bow proudly reported to the General Assembly in 1985 that the amount collected up
to that time exceeded $9 million. He also made a point of expressing “my heartfelt
gratitude to the Member States, most of which are developing countries, that have made a
considerable financial contribution to the Organization. Such contributions will enable us
to continue successfully in our fight for universality with all countries having a voice.”
(M'Bow, 1985)
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Easily recognizable in these statements is the reinforcement of the idea that
UNESCO would continue on unabashed even without the United States. Especially
important is the recognition of the developing countries’ contributions to “the cause”
because this reinforces the idea that the majority of nations support the rationales for
which UNESCO (and its Director General) had been recently laboring. What was not as
well known is that the majority of the countries contributing voluntarily were also part of
the coalition banding together in 1987, strategizing to re-elect M’Bow to another term in
office. All this produced a vicious battle within the Executive Board – a battle fraught
with political maneuvering and tactics between those who were adamant upon
maintaining course under M’Bow and those who were equally adamant that a new
direction would better serve UNESCO.
A third issue arising within Executive Board meetings concerned how to deal with
the nearly 1,000 U.S. citizens still working in positions at UNESCO. Part of the reason
for this was to make sure that quotas of employees from each member state would be
redistributed fairly. But M’Bow recognized that there were two groups of minds about
how to handle current employees. One group felt they should be treated like any other
employee – that their contracts should be renewed dependent on their evaluations of their
performance. Another group – one to which M’Bow belonged – felt that it would be
unfair to member states to keep these employees with UNESCO beyond the frame of
their current contracts. He also raised the issue that most of these U.S. employees were
having their U.S. income taxes reimbursed by UNESCO for their service. UNESCO had
an agreement with the U.S. government to recoup these costs. However the U.S. had
ceased this agreement two years prior to its withdrawal and that created for UNESCO
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another budgetary dilemma tallying close to $500,000. In the end, it was decided to keep
employees only through the completion of their contracts, although some employees of
the Secretariat finally were allowed to continue for longer (UNESCO Executive Board,
1985). But the fact that there were two distinct sides within the Executive Board on
nearly all of these issues was a sign of conflicts likely to soon boil over.
Many examples from both the public and private meetings and speeches illustrate
M’Bow’s determination to “stay the course” with UNESCO – with or without the United
States. Many of these instances also demonstrate an aggressive tone towards the U.S.
government. But none are better than the speech previously mentioned, given by M’Bow
to the 23rd session of the General Conference of UNESCO. This was the first address
given to the entire organization after the departure of the United States. Thus, it was the
first opportunity to provide official reaction – and direction – to the body of the
organization.
M'Bow's 1985 speech began with expressions of gratitude for the support of the
Executive board – a ploy doubtlessly used to convey unity of purpose in the UNESCO
leadership. M'Bow then pointed to the agreement on the Medium-Range Plan adopted at
the General Conference two years prior, one of the very documents pointed to by the U.S.
upon its decision to withdraw. M’Bow painted this agreement as one in which the nations
of the worlds were in agreement and he stressed that nations continued to work toward
Medium-Range goals in common purpose. In referring to the biennial program adopted
the previous year by UNESCO, “also by consensus,” M’Bow said that, “the
representatives of the various regional groups all, without exception, made a point of
stressing their favourable assessment of the results of the Conference, which was indeed
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marked by a spirit of active co-operation and by a political will for conciliation which
could be seen as a hopeful sign for the future” (M'Bow, 1985).
Against the backdrop of an asserted “world consensus” for a plan that was
actually rather controversial, M’Bow proceeded to explain the tasks he derived from the
1984 conference, painting those tasks as weighty, but important. He argued that much
had been done to accomplish those tasks and once again expressed his gratitude to the
Executive Board. Then, after tallying successes, M'Bow immediately reiterates a list of
“impediments” that he notes prevent the attainment of goals supported elsewhere in the
world wanted – and foregrounds the withdrawal of the U.S. from membership. “But from
the outset, these efforts were set against the background of the submission of notice of
withdrawal…” referring to the U.S., Britain and Singapore individually (M'Bow, 1985).
He sought to show how these nations were resisting international majorities, noting that
the fact that their withdrawals were “accompanied by a series of observations and
criticisms on various aspects of the functioning of the Organization and on sovereign
decisions adopted by the General Conference” (M'Bow, 1985).
M’Bow makes the withdrawal into a personal issue, stating that “ the
Organization – and at times even its Director-General – were subjected to a vigorous
press campaign conducted by some of the media, in which a concern for objectivity all
too often gave way to systematic denigration and even slander; the issues at stake therein,
which are now beginning to emerge more clearly, will no doubt have to be clarified one
day. Meanwhile, voices were raised on all sides to reaffirm the attachment to UNESCO
of the very great majority of Member States” (M'Bow, 1985).
It is clear that UNESCO, under M’Bow and following the withdrawal of the U.S.,
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intended to maintain course rhetorically and in policy by adhering to those principles the
U.S. government found most distasteful when it decided to leave. It is also clear, given
the documents from the secretly held Executive Board meetings, that the picture of
unanimous support was less rosy in reality. Finally, it is clear that M’Bow intended his
remarks to bolster the enthusiasm for UNESCO among those already inclined to support
him, motivate and persuade those still sitting on the fence, and paint into a corner those
opposed to his articulated direction.
M’Bow was in for a fight he surely knew was coming. Just a year later, in
preparation for elections coming up in 1987, the Executive Board met to adopt a
procedure for the nomination of candidates for Director General. In this meeting, it was
discussed how the coming elections were likely to be contentious between those
supporting M’Bow and the considerable group actively working against him (UNESCO
Executive Board, 1986). The Board concluded that a strict procedure was required to
allow for nominations to progress to candidacy. In accordance with this new procedure,
on October 10, 1986, the chairman of the Executive Board addressed a circular letter to
member states inviting them to suggest to him, confidentially, if possible before April 2,
1987, the names of persons who might be considered for the post of Director General. On
May 27, 1987, the chairman sent a letter to member states containing the list of
candidates proposed to that date together with the names of member states who supported
them. Updated lists were sent to member states weekly during September 1987, all this
activity leading up to the elections in October (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987). The
period of contentious transition was about to begin and it is clear those affiliated with
UNESCO knew the storm was coming.
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A detailed account of the procedural maneuvering that took place in the fight
between supporters of M’Bow and those seeking change is not necessary to confirm that
UNESCO originally intended to continue its course with or without the U.S., as well as to
contrast their previous position with the position adopted after the change of directors
general – which sets up the first phase of how UNESCO’s history maps to Crawford’s
framework. Suffice it to say that the list of candidates was narrowed down several times
in October, 1987 meetings of the Executive Board. At one time, M’Bow removed his
name from consideration, only to have his supporters work hard using procedural
technicalities to have his name put back on the list when the supposed leading opposition
candidate was eliminated. It is also important to note that U.S. membership (or lack
thereof) was a theme that was mentioned only indirectly throughout the elections, even
though the direct interviews I conducted with some UNESCO officials confirmed that the
organization’s position on U.S. membership (and specifically the Director General’s
views of this topic) was clearly an under-the-table theme that persistently lurked in the
discussions held among delegates from member states (UNESCO Executive Board,
1987).
The result of the election was the elevation of Federico Mayor, from Spain, to the
post of Director General. His election signaled an end of overt public hostilities between
UNESCO leadership and the U.S. government, but it did not immediately result in a
return to membership for the U.S. I argue that UNESCO was still required to use all the
tools at its disposal to discursively box in the U.S., thereby leaving it no other option but
to return. Interviews with UNESCO officials confirm this position.
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Phase One: Dissociating UNESCO from NWICO
I would characterize M’Bow’s time as Director-General as one of
pursuing a political agenda for small and developing nations regardless of
the costs. Mayor brought ideology and purpose to UNESCO as a whole.
Everyone rallied around the principles Mayor brought. (Koichiro)
Matsuura (the next Director-General elected in 1999) brought business
and management direction with no change of philosophy. Each one brings
a different look and lately, it has been exactly what the organization
needed at just the right time (Coutelle, 2009).
The previous discussion aimed to establish the clear direction in which UNESCO
was headed – centered chiefly on the shoulders of whoever served in the position of
Director General at a given time. It also sought to evidence the seeds of discord within
UNESCO's governing body regarding that direction. In Chapter 1 information was
offered to demonstrate that seeds of discord about the foundational mandate were present
even from the beginning. Here I seek to document the clear-cut change in direction for
UNESCO signified by the election of Spain's Federico Mayor to the seat of the Director
General. As before, archival records from UNESCO headquarters and relevant to the
topic at hand will be used. In addition, I draw extensively upon speeches given by Mayor
and by two depth interviews I recently conducted with Mayor at his Foundation for a
Culture of Peace Headquarters in Madrid (one in 2007, the other in August of 2009).
However, of the hundreds of speeches given by Mayor during his time in office,
most relevant to this section is his inaugural speech to the UNESCO General Assembly
on November 16, 1987, and a speech given to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations in
New York City on May 9, 1988. These speeches are important for two reasons. First, the
inaugural address provided Mayor with his first chance to establish the tone of his
leadership. All UNESCO, as well as the UN and the international community, was aware
of at least some level of conflict within UNESCO relating to NWICO and the U.S.
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departure. They were aware of the tension between M’Bow and the U.S. government.
With this recent conflict still in mind, the inaugural address enabled a first opportunity to
define what was to be. Mayor's inaugural address is thus an ideal moment in which his
anticipated changes in direction can be specified, and this within the logics of Perelman's
strategic emphasis on rhetorics of dissociation, which also roughly map onto the first
phase of Crawford’s model.
The speech given in New York was Mayor’s first official address delivered to an
audience associated with the U.S. government – or at least to American opinion leaders
UNESCO was seeking to persuade of the merits of membership. As with the inaugural
address, the New York speech provides an ideal location from which to analyze elements
of dissociation from NWICO, as well as the associative logics implied by the case for a
return to the foundational principles of UNESCO’s origin.
From the outset, it was apparent that Mayor had become the champion of the
group within UNESCO fighting for the participation of all nations – not just the large or
just the small, or developing nations. In the Executive Board meeting documents from the
meetings to elect a new director general, a huge debate was waged between opposing
sides within UNESCO. On the one hand, nations such as Pakistan expressed public
concern that UNESCO’s current direction should be maintained because it would greatly
benefit the developing nations. Pakistan offered it’s own candidate, who was widely
endorsed by many nations, stating that is was the nation’s desire, “to ensure that this
important post should be occupied by a personality from the developing countries, for
whom international cooperation in the fields of science, education and culture is most
vital. Since Africa and Latin America have had the privilege of leading this organization,
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Pakistan responded to a broadly held view that Asia would now be offered the
opportunity of serving in this important office” (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987). The
Pakistani delegation went on to cite the importance of equal flow of information – an
issue at the heart of the NWICO debate. Responding to this, a Finnish representative
expressed an opposing view, stating that in order to truly accomplish the organizational
mission, a candidate who supported efforts to have all nations represented (both those
departed and those not in membership) would best serve the long-term interests of
UNESCO.
The debate was rather heated, and when M’Bow’s candidacy was announced and
a situation of divided support presented itself, Pakistan withdrew its candidate to more
fully consolidate the votes favoring M’Bow. After a whirlwind of debate, the field of
candidates was narrowed to M’Bow and Mayor. Because a majority supported Mayor,
the procedure required that Mayor’s name be presented to the delegates for approval or
rejection. The final vote, taken by secret ballot, was 30 votes in favor and 20 votes
against (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987). Thus began the era of Federico Mayor as
director general. The election also signaled that the majority of UNESCO’s member
states favored a change in policy – enough to unseat an incumbent candidate.
Executive Board documents generated in the immediate aftermath of Mayor’s
ascension to the leadership position detail the first occasions available to the Mayor team
to “huddle” and plan for the future. While verbatim accounts of what was said in this
meeting were not available, summaries of what was said in the meeting have been
analyzed.
The Executive Board voted in agreement of the need to convince the three
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departed members to return. It also expressed a firm commitment to return to the
foundational mandate of UNESCO and to step aside from the charged topics of the
NWICO years. Mayor delivered an impassioned plea to step outside the prevailing logics
of state sovereignty, in favor of an approach that looked instead to individuals as the
establishing agents of norms and values that would promote peace from the grassroots.
He argued that UNESCO was the only international body positioned and able to succeed
in this goal. Specific directions were given that UNESCO was to avoid language
alienating to U.N. member states – an emphasis for Mayor given the importance of a
united direction for the future. Discussion also raised the issue of the need for a U.S.
return for budgetary reasons, but it was also the prevailing view that the financial issue
was not to be the focus of UNESCO’s efforts (UNESCO Executive Board, 1987). The
best place to see this new program enacted is in the subsequently delivered public
speeches.
Despite the absence of academic attention to Mayor’s first speech, the one given
on the occasion of his installation as Director General, we find a classical example of
argumentation theory. It is a speech drafted with a very particular audience in mind.
While there are references to particular audiences (such as supporters of the previous
direction, supporters of the change in direction, and fence-sitters), under the framework
of Perelman’s scheme, the analyst can easily see that it evokes a “universal audience”
consisting of all the imagined members of the international community. While the
universal audience for Perelman is not a definable entity (made up only in the mind of the
orator), the universal audience Mayor first attempts to bring into play is more concrete
(though still somewhat difficult to define) and encompasses an assemblage of smaller,
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more particular audiences.
Mayor starts with a direct appeal to the foundational mandates of the
organization, followed by a direct reference to the need to have the U.S. (and others)
return to membership – linking this need to the importance of the mandate. His opening
words are a quote from one of the early Directors general of UNESCO – Jaime Torres
Bodet, of Mexico, about the importance of the security of the future generations. The
resonances with the UNESCO charter are unmistakable when he says, “ it is our
commitment that determines the future. We are committed to illuminating the paths of
tomorrow’s world by promoting education, science and culture. These enduring and
unalterable goals and principles must also guide our present decisions, faithfully
reflecting maturity, serenity and the spirit of understanding and agreement” (Mayor,
Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).
There are several devices at work in this opening. First, the passage directly
accesses the rhetoric of the UNESCO constitution, instantiating its principles as enduring
and unalterable, and in so doing directly aligns the organization's historical mission with
contemporary guiding lights for present decisions – at root this is, then, an associative
logic that collapses the historical interlude by seeking to return UNESCO's work to its
moment of origination. In this, Mayor expresses a theme wholly acceptable to his
imagined universal audience, since that audience can be readily thought to have accepted
the goals and purposes of UNESCO – even if those goals had been far from the center of
discussion in previous decades. Second, his use of the words of an early Mexican director
general (in fact the only director general to that point, excepting the controversial
M’Bow, who was not originally a citizen of a major world power) speak directly to the
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audience of supporters still stinging from the defeat of M’Bow – a ploy that recurs in this
speech.
The next portion of his speech wastes no time in addressing the most sensitive
point of contention for the organization – the departure of three member nations. In
another reference to the foundation, Mayor emphasized, “that unity, common vision, and
unavoidable striving after the construction of peace in the minds of men,” provided a
clear goal for the organization. That goal and, “clear common purpose, both implicitly
and explicitly, require the prompt return of the countries that have withdrawn and the
inclusion among us of those that have not yet become Members. For if we are united –
and only if we are all united – we shall be able to prepare the ground to ensure that the
coming millennium can really begin with ‘springs flowing freely and plentiful corn’"
(Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987). The last phrase uses Bodet’s
own language referring to the future generations.
The direct reference to the departures of the U.S., U.K. and Singapore – in only
the second paragraph of the speech – coupled with the concept of a required return in
order to accomplish the foundational mandate, is a direct association to Perelman’s
typology, because the text links the idea of the accomplishment of a mandate everyone
accepts, to the return of the departed countries – inferring such a goal could not be
accomplished without return. As such, in two paragraphs, Mayor has appealed to a
common goal, and then stipulated that the goal is unattainable without everyone’s
cooperation.
This argument appealed to those who opposed M’Bow’s controversial (and antiU.S.) stance. It served to bring in an audience of fence-sitters by galvanizing them behind
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a goal that was thought universally acceptable. Finally, it appealed to those who opposed
his candidacy for DG by calling for the inclusion of all people and by quoting a previous
DG’s statements regarding the need to secure the future of generations to come. The fact
that this former DG was from what was then a clearly identified developing nation,
appealed to this audience greatly. The fact that it was not the controversial M’Bow made
this link acceptable to other audiences.
The issue of audience is again evoked by Mayor’s next topic: that of his
controversial election to the DG position. It was a simple transition to carry over the
rhetoric of “unity” and “common goals” from a discussion of overall organizational
direction to a discussion about his rise to leadership. He refers directly to the “genuinely
democratic” nature of the elections that resulted in his taking office (a reference to the
norm widely held by the target audience valuing democratic election of leadership) and
tells the audience that, “I stand before you today not as the Director-General of one group
or another but as the Director-General of all, without exception; the Director-General of
all Member States, without distinction, all on a footing of complete equality and with
equal regard for all their cultural diversities; everyone’s Director-General, with the
independence derived from the absolute figures of vote” (Mayor, Speech to General
Conference of UNESCO, 1987). Once again, this is a device used to dissociate from the
contention previously at work in UNESCO.
In Perelman’s framework, a speaker will use logical pairs of concepts to
dissociate ideas. One of his more commonly used pairs of concepts is the
appearance/reality pair. Perelman relates appearance to the top of the logical pairing –
what he calls “term I,” or what is apparent, actual, immediate or known directly. The
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bottom concept in the pair is usually an opposite to the top. In this case, reality is the
bottom of the pair, which Perelman calls “term II,” which he says can only be understood
by comparison with term I. He says it “results from a dissociation effected within term I
with the purpose of getting rid of the incompatibilities that may appear between different
aspects of term I” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968).
With regard to the case at hand, to that point in time, by Mayor’s point of view,
the appearance, which Perelman would call term I, was that UNESCO was headed in a
direction supported by the former Director General (which was the reason the U.S. gave
for its departure). Yet, to the audience Mayor was speaking, there had been enough
evidence to support that this direction was reality, or term II. Even the election of Mayor
to his post would not be enough to dissociate what was viewed as reality to the target
audience. In order to establish a new direction, Mayor had to reverse the order of the pair
by dissociating from the previous direction. He does this by first stating that his election
was the consequence of the expression of a majority opinion, promising that because the
majority opinion elected him, he would represent everyone. The implication is that the
course he would set would be a reflection of the will of the whole, not just “one group or
another,” as Mayor puts it.
This is further evidence of Mayor’s attempts at dissociation. What Mayor has
done here is an intentional ploy to build a new unity behind the new reality he intends
UNESCO to pursue (reversing the appearance/reality pair). By invoking two norms
generally accepted by his audience he is both beginning the process of dissociation from
NWICO and building the base that would form his universal audience in years to come.
The first of these two norms is the value placed on the legitimacy of democratic
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processes as speaking for the majority. Also related to this norm is the weight and
emphasis placed on every member state being on a “footing of complete equality” – a
concept very closely tied to the concept of democracy. Also note the usage of the words
“absolute figures of vote.” Clearly, Mayor is associating these principles to his election
and using the resulting strength to validate the courses his tenure would pursue.
The second norm invoked is the norm that establishes the importance of
UNESCO as an organization and the need for unity in pursuit of common goals. This is a
value instilled in those working with UNESCO from the beginning and Mayor uses the
concept of unity as a connecting link to the courses he will pursue. The continuing
passages of this speech are intended specifically to accomplish this link. As Perelman
puts it, “it is the compromise solution to incompatibilities which calls for the greatest
effort and is most difficult to justify because it requires a new structuration of reality. On
the other hand, once it is established, once the concepts have been dissociated and
restructured, compromise tends to appear as the inescapable solution and to react on the
aggregate of concepts into which it is inserted” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1968).
The incompatibilities in this case exist between the nations supporting the NWICO
movement and the nations who would oppose many concepts of that movement. The
situation indeed called for a restructuration of reality, and that meant redefining
UNESCO and its direction.
Mayor goes on to offer up the fact that many “outstanding intellectuals throughout
the world,” the Secretariat, and many others had encouraged him to “take on this task,”
thereby adding to the list of evidence that this course is endorsed by the majority – a
majority devoid of U.S. input. Rather than associating with particular factions, Mayor
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prefers to cling to the foundational mandate (again, appealing to a sense of
organizationally unity), offering up hope that the organization could overcome obstacles
in its path, including the “premature disenchantment” of some nations. This tie to the
foundation of UNESCO only increases in the next portion of his speech.
After spending time referring to member states, Mayor then addresses the issue
direction by distinctly attaching himself (and thus the organization) to the foundational
charter by pointing out that “behind the term ‘State,’ which refers to a country’s political
and administrative structure, are the people and civic society which are its real historical
embodiment. My appeal, my call for a joint effort today concerns them most particularly”
(Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987). After following up by
saying how the individuals that made up the various organizational groups within
UNESCO had to work together – regardless of national affiliation – to achieve their
goals. The following could not demonstrate any more clearly the point:
In this differing but combined effort, we can all refer to one sure guide, the
Constitution of UNESCO, the true Magna Carta of our Organization,
whose principles are today as valid, or more so, than when they were
established. These principles which the passage of time has confirmed and
strengthened are thus for us inviolable and will be, for me, the compass
which will determine and guide our action at all times (Mayor, Speech to
General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).
Clearly, Mayor intends to use the foundational mandate to dissociate the organization
from the charged themes of the previous two decades.
Mayor's argumentative strategy of association/dissociation continues in the next
portion of his speech, wherein he uses metaphor to show how his training is exactly what
is needed at such a difficult time. Mayor recounts a series of great and unfortunate trends
and occurrences that have occurred over the previous thirty years. Many of these
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occurrences are scientific in nature – such as species loss, environmental damage, and
biological engineering. He lists a great number of trends and events easily recognizable to
those present. With that backdrop, he brings in the metaphor:
My training is that of a scientist, and a scientist is, by definition, a man
accustomed to teamwork, in whom boundless hope – of possible discovery
or innovation – coexists with the implacable realism of daily experimental
practice. The scientist advances only gradually, in a process of
accumulating contrasted certainties. But, in his view, far from being the
goal at the end of an operation, verification is a new starting point that
starts the climb upward once more. This modesty of pace, this need to
check the validity and utility of objectives that one sets oneself, will
obviously be mine. There can be no others. Modesty and ambition then, as
two indissociable dimensions of the one and only aim: to be useful
(Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).
Mayor then compares the qualities of a scientist to the qualities needed in a DG at this
particular period in time. The metaphor is designed to paint the perfect picture of a DG as
the person trained as a scientist. He goes on to mention that a scientist is also perfectly
suited to direct an organization tasked to oversee scientific advances.
The speech does a number of other important things, including the outlining of
several obstacles that will need to be overcome in the near future. But the speech's most
significant accomplishment is that it interpellates a universal audience to which Mayor
will continue to appeal for the rest of his term in office – and indeed the rest of his career
to this date. Drawing broadly, again, from the language of the UNESCO charter, Mayor
spoke of coming together in a fight worth fighting.
This symbol of solidarity – of North, South, East and West joining hands –
might bring a glimmer of light to the horizon. In this context I call upon all
States – and particularly the most developed – to work together in
conjunction with numerous associate experts, and to encourage their
young people to contribute to one of the boldest transformations for which
the world is still calling: the struggle – the only struggle in which we
should be called to enlist – against illiteracy, the struggle against
ignorance, and the struggle for individual and collective independence
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(Mayor, Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).
In order to evoke his universal audience, Mayor first needed to acknowledge the
contributions (real or perceived) of his predecessor to appeal to those who have been
supporters of the opposition within UNESCO. Healing the divisions within UNESCO
was crucial to establishing a unified audience needed to call upon the U.S. to rejoin the
fight for which UNESCO was formed. Mayor did this in a personal way, by thanking his
predecessor for his tireless service heading up the organization, and by linking himself to
M’Bow, noting how much he had learned during his three years as M’Bow’s Deputy
Director-General. The combination of this personal linkage, in which Mayor referred to
M’Bow as “an African of universal stature,” with the language of change and return to
the goals of the creation of UNESCO, Mayor was able to appeal to opposition (especially
African) without attaching himself to the charged policies the opposition had pursued.
Indeed, Mayor finishes his speech with one final tribute to the opposition as a
gesture of unity and healing, and his gesture spells out clearly how he sees the pieces
coming together for the future.
I hope the he (M’Bow) may continue for many years to highlight the most
urgent development needs of the peoples. In order that multilateral
cooperation may be concentrated on the essential aspects of progress and
eliminate those which are harmful. In order that important long-term
activities may not constantly be set aside for the most urgent. May he
continue for many years to help in making into reality these goals (Mayor,
Speech to General Conference of UNESCO, 1987).
Mayor leaves little doubt that he considers worthwhile the pursuits of the opposition, yet
more urgent the need to return to “the minds of men.”
In direct interviews with Mayor, perhaps misunderstanding the intent of the
questions, Mayor took exception to the inference that the organization changed its
rhetoric and used argumentation to begin the process needed to lure the U.S. back in to
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membership.
It’s not like we bowed down to the demands of the U.S. government. We
believed at that time, as I believe now, that having everyone at the table
working together – no matter how distasteful one finds the views of those
across the table – is the only way to achieve peace. Sure, we backed away
from confrontational positions. But we did so to pursue what I still believe
is a more important course – teaching people to want peace. Only in that
way will States be inclined to pursue peaceful policies. If I didn’t truly
believe in the direction we argued in favor of, why would I continue to
pursue those goals even outside the auspices of UNESCO?” (Mayor,
Former Director-General of UNESCO, 2009).
Mayor then went on to point out that the rhetoric used in his Foundation for a Culture of
Peace was nearly identical to much of the rhetoric used during his tenure as DG of
UNESCO – a fact that is, indeed, true. He began the foundation in March of 2000,
immediately following his departure from UNESCO and used the same language about a
culture of peace that was found in UNESCO documents during the time of his term in
office.
It must be pointed out – and Mayor himself willingly admits – that much of the
ideology behind a “culture of peace” which was the centerpiece of the new direction
UNESCO had taken, came from a collaboration between Dr. David Adams, a
psychologist from Connecticut who later developed and became director of UNESCO’s
Culture of Peace Program, and Father Felipe MacGregor, a Jesuit scholar from Peru.
Mayor saw this as the embodiment of the direction he wanted to take UNESCO and
brought Adams on board to oversee many programs organized by UNESCO worldwide.
Thus, his disagreement with the inference that argumentation was used only with the end
of luring the U.S. back into membership.
Mayor punctuated his disagreement with such an assertion by also pointing out
that despite his upbringing as a biologist and the many endeavors he could have pursued
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in that field, he chose to continue on the path that he felt would make the most difference
in the world, drawing the final point that doing so for all these years after his tenure had
nothing to do with getting any State to join any organization. Mayor claims to be a
“converted disciple” of the ideology “culture of peace” and encouraged me several times
to let him get me in touch with Adams to see why he so fully believed in his cause.
But Mayor’s points of disagreement actually serve only to prove my larger claim,
and this is revealed in his statement that “while this path was seen as the best route to get
the U.S. to agree to return, it also happened to be the right path” (Mayor, Former
Director-General of UNESCO, 2009). If the language of this first speech isn’t enough to
draw such conclusions, the interview with Mayor certainly confirms that UNESCO was
attempting to deconstruct itself from the charged themes that surrounded NWICO. It also
confirms that Mayor saw the need to portray a unified front in this effort, and had
concluded that a unified front was necessary to add weight to those calling for a U.S.
return (and to construct a universal audience, I would argue), all contained within the
larger context of his insistence that this unified front was not simply a ploy to get the U.S.
to return, but also something necessary to accomplish UNESCO’s goals.
These themes are more fully foregrounded in Mayor's first address given to a
strictly U.S. audience, and on U.S. soil. If the model I have sought to elaborate is to hold,
Mayor’s speech should clearly be attempting to distance himself from charged themes,
recommit to the core values for which UNESCO was formed, call upon a universal
audience, and promise great change and a bright future for UNESCO. In fact, his speech
to the Council on Foreign Relations on May 9, 1988 does just that.
In the CFR speech, the language of dissociation from the NWICO years is not
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subtle, but blatant and present even from the start. Following the obligatory
acknowledgement of the superb efforts of the Council of Foreign Relations over the
years, he states that the world is in as great a need of the “innovative solutions” the
council has been involved with in the past. He then pledges UNESCO’s presence in
helping to solve those world issues. “Whatever the situation and however grave the
problems, UNESCO would make its contribution to the search for solutions though its
fields of competence. I repeat, through its fields of competence: education, science,
culture and communication” (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations,
1988). This statement establishes from the start that UNESCO intended to be only that
for which it was formed without overstepping its bounds – a key issue of concern during
the NWICO years.
The next segment of this speech gets right to the point of the whole speech – that
UNESCO has returned to the ideals it once was supposed to uphold. He does this by
tapping the well-known verbiage of the UNESCO Constitution “since wars begin in the
minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be constructed,”
and “that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of
governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere
support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is
not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.” Mayor argues that
“this message is still valid today,” and cites recent peaceful developments between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union as examples.
Nearly missed at this part of the speech is a direct reference to the audience to
which Mayor will seek approval for the duration of his tenure – and would rely on to

92

provide the weight needed to secure a U.S. return. He attempts to establish a direct link
between the mission of UNESCO and this audience when he says, “this peace process
will need the support of the international community whose thoughts and actions carry
considerable weight and must be directed towards the brining about the intellectual and
moral solidarity of mankind” (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations,
1988). Note specifically the emphasis on the need for the international community to
remain involved and his nod to this community as holding the final relevant power. The
discursive choices enact the sort of leverage Krebs speaks of in his model of rhetorical
coercion, and Mayor is in this speech (as well as in many others) bolstering the weight of
argument as he seeks to frame the issues for his potential audience.
At this point Mayor begins to utilize more direct argumentation techniques to add
weight to his case that the U.S. should rejoin. He does this first by restating the fact that
he intends to hold UNESCO to the scope of its original mandate. In doing so, he directly
references the absence of three important nations:
I am sharing these thoughts with you because, on taking up the duties of DirectorGeneral, in a period which has been characterized as one of a crisis of
multilateralism, I felt it essential to concentrate on the simple core of mandates,
goals and ethics that define UNESCO’s functions. I have taken up my duties at a
time when three member states – including the United States of America – have
withdrawn from the organization, I none the less do so in a spirit of optimism
(Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988).
He then mentions again (though for the first time in this venue) his training as a scientist,
noting that his training has taught him that no state of affairs, however disturbing, need
be permanent – and here Mayor evokes long-held U.S. cultural values, linking those to
his own. “I believe that resignation and pessimism are mistaken attitudes and that
dreaming and thinking – with a considerable dose of pragmatism – can generally lead to
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solutions” (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988). The similarities
between these statements, and values embedded in American culture of hard work
without giving up can bring about the American Dream are a direct attempt to link with
common values of his audience.
Mayor then outlines a string of arguments linking the current mission of
UNESCO to goals of common interest in the U.S. He talks about how both would agree
on certain multilateral initiatives, such as literacy and education, scientific exploration,
and even global, natural and cultural heritage, “for which there is such a great concern
both at UNESCO and in the United States,” and says he believes it to be in the best
interest of both to continue working together. He next argues that UNESCO has changed
to assure these goals are at the forefront, stating that, “reform is the order of the day at
UNESCO. This has taken concrete shape in the preparation of the organization’s next
Medium-Term Plan for the period 1990-1995.” He describes this plan as anchored in a
set of unifying concepts based on the notion that UNESCO is acting as a catalyst among
the many international actors.
In terms of Perelman’s scheme of dissociation, once again Mayor is attempting to
move from appearance (Term I) – or the UNESCO that vigorously pursued NWICO for
better than a decade – to a newly constructed reality – or a UNESCO that has changed
and he draws upon the action/intention logical pair when he talks about reforms taking
“concrete shape” in the form of the organization’s plans. He follows this by addressing
another concern of the U.S. – that of management and budgetary difficulties at UNESCO.
Yet, while he talks of these issues, he makes it clear that these issues alone would not be
enough to make UNESCO useful. To do that, it must “hold fast to its central ethical
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core.”
All this leads into a discussion of the main point of contention the U.S. had with
UNESCO – the free flow on information. Mayor tells his audience that without question
UNESCO stands for a free flow of information and the freedom of the individual. To
drive this point home, he quotes from the 19th Article of the Declaration of Human
Rights, which says: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” If this
wasn’t enough to completely dissociate UNESCO from the parts of NWICO the U.S.
found so distasteful, he the UNESCO Constitution yet again, which asserts: “The States
Parties to this Constitution believing in… the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and
in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and
to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these
means for the purpose of mutual understanding and more perfect knowledge of each
other’s lives.”
These quotes from the Constitution served two purposes. First, they make it very
clear that UNESCO was departing (or dissociating) from its previous course. Second,
they served to bind UNESCO to its foundational mandate. One quote came from outside
UNESCO, one from UNESCO itself (the Constitution). His clarification addresses the
NWICO controversy head-on: “Of course, imbalances in the capacity to communicate
exist in the world. Often we see developing countries rich in resources remain poor
because they lack the infrastructure to communicate for development. My aim is not to
place restrictions on those who have developed powerful systems of communication. It is
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to increase the practical communication capabilities of those who need them most
desperately” (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988). This is in stark
contrast to the rhetoric and position embraced by the previous DG, who made no excuses
about working to curtail the influence of nations with highly developed media in order to
level the playing field with respect to emerging nations.
Mayor also argues for the importance of collaboration (back-handedly referring to
U.S. membership) in education and science. He suggests that while the U.S. could
participate as an observer in many of UNESCO’s projects, it would only have significant
input if it were collaborating as a member state. Together, he argued, and “emphasizing
action based on mutual interest among all parties, and by focusing on the things that unite
us that we avoid the waste and misunderstandings caused by divisiveness” (Mayor,
Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988).
The last argument Mayor makes in his speech, refers to the reforms his
organization had undertaken – policies implemented in direct reaction to U.S. criticisms
of mismanagement and budgetary indiscretions. He spends some time pointing out the
managerial changes put in place to correct issues the U.S. has raised during M’Bow’s
tenure. No specifics are addressed in this section – a tactic purposefully used, I believe.
The points of argumentation remain purposely vague. Mayor was unlikely to be criticized
for this vagueness, since he had only recently taken office, and he was likely to receive
credit for addressing the matter at all given the contentious history. The tactic is
rhetorically clever, and while I do not suggest it as a rationalization, it should be noted
that in pointing out general plans for accountability, Mayor must have been aware that his
recent ascension to office provided him some latitude in the minds of his audience. The
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point was to argue that changes were underway – another hint to his “reform is the order
of the day at UNESCO” rhetoric.
Mayor concludes his speech with an impassioned plea to members of the council
to use the power and influence it holds to change the ideas Americans held about
UNESCO. He once again links U.S. and UNESCO interests and hints that only with U.S.
help will the reforms and goals he has sketched truly occur. His final thoughts
encapsulate the public intentions of his speech.
The Council on Foreign Relations has always been promoting a constant
process of thinking and rethinking about America’s relationships in the
world. It is in this spirit of dialogue and analysis that I hope the Council
will help keep minds in the United States open, dispassionate and
objective on UNESCO. I maintain that UNESCO sells not bread, but
yeast. I sincerely hope that your country will one day soon play its part
again in ensuring that our yeast makes the best bread, for everyone’s
consumption. In an intellectualized UNESCO, I am convinced your
country and other ‘absent parties’ will find renewed interest in what we
stand for (Mayor, Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, 1988).
What these two speeches and other documents help establish is that the highest
leadership of UNESCO, including the DG himself, recognized that a change in tone, if
not direction, was needed. They establish that decisions were made to back away from
contention and attempt to bring all nations together in pursuit of UNESCO’s original
mandate. Finally they establish firmly the presence of a universal audience in the mind of
Mayor, at the very least (along with his comments in interviews), and quite likely, in the
minds of the Executive Board.
Many further speeches during the years 1988 to 1990 made similar arguments
attempting to delegitimize UNESCO’s association to NWICO – though none were quite
as passionate as the first speeches given during Mayor’s tenure in office. But, as
Crawford points out in her model, these changes in attitudes and norms do not gain
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immediate traction. Time had to pass with continued distance from the unwanted
association. Also, the association to a new direction has to be constructed and built to the
point where policy begins to take shape.
Phase Two: Embracing the foundation
Mayor’s first two years in office (phase one) were dedicated to his articulated
recognition that organizational changes were required, including the ascension of Mayor
to the DG seat, and the creation of a new rhetorical tone. That tone distanced UNESCO
from the NWICO themes and an association or reattachment to foundational values. But,
as Crawford points out, such a change in direction takes time to gain momentum. Indeed,
in UNESCO’s case, it was necessary to maintain this new rhetorical direction for some
time before even the majority of its own members bought in to the change.
Jumping forward to 1990, three years after Mayor’s takeover, UNESCO
continued to dissociate itself from the NWICO years. In fact, none of the speeches given
by Mayor between 1990 and the time he left UNESCO in 1999 contained the slightest
mention of support for themes tied to NWICO. Nearly all, however, included varying
degrees of the verbiage analyzed previously, where the variance at any given time
depended on the audience being addressed.
One example is a speech given in 1995 to UNESCO delegates at the opening of
the first UNESCO Philosophy forum – an event started by Mayor that has endured to this
date. If references (or even hints) to previously charged themes of NWICO were to occur,
it would be in this speech. The forum wherein it was given was intended to debate
philosophy with hopes of coming up with new ways to pursue UNESCO’s philosophical
goals. In this speech, Mayor spoke of knowledge on a philosophical level. Once again,
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there was no reference to NWICO, or any of its more controversial themes. Rather, the
whole speech was dedicated to the very philosophical pairs of argumentation upon which
Mayor had been dissociating from the past. Among the best examples of this is his use of
the knowledge/thinking pair.
What characterizes human intelligence? Awareness of ends, of ultimate
purpose. Hence I dislike the usefulness of the word ‘artificial intelligence’.
However sophisticated it may be, advanced technology is of no interest to
me if I do not know how it is going to enable people to live better –
‘perfection without purpose’. The importance of knowledge depends on
what is done with it. Accumulating knowledge constitutes, when you
come to think of it, a dangerous activity: if knowledge can prevent one
from deciding or acting, it may also prevent one from thinking (Mayor,
Speech to UNESCO Philosophy Forum, 1995).
This is drastically different to the language used during NWICO, though the theme –
knowledge and information – was also a driving force of NWICO. But Mayor does draw
liberally on his language of unity and common purpose that he established when he first
took office. He connects these logical pairs to the reality of the new focus on UNESCO’s
long-held foundation.
The consistency of our branches of knowledge can no longer have the
characteristic that was guaranteed by the Aristotelian cosmos; it cannot
determine a priori and definitively the limits between the thinkable and
the unthinkable. Both science and technology are constantly shifting such
limits and engendering possibilities that disrupt the order of thinking and
the social order alike. We are irreversibly caught up in an open-ended
history in which what individuals and society can do is being put to the
test (Mayor, Speech to UNESCO Philosophy Forum, 1995).
And with these words, he calls upon UNESCO to perform the function it was created to
do – to become a forum for the discussion of these matters as knowledge becomes
wisdom. The fact that he applies this logic in areas of UNESCO’s competence – namely
science, culture and communication provides a strong link to the reality he had worked so
hard to establish beginning eight years before this speech.
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Another example of the continued use of argumentation throughout the second
phase of this transition comes in a speech given by Mayor to the International Conference
on Culture of Peace and Governance in Mozambique in 1997. Along with the standard
language referring to education in the “minds of men” being necessary to thwart war, this
speech provides an excellent example of Mayor’s continued call to return to the basics for
which UNESCO was founded.
As the century ends, we must now fully honor the promise made in 1945.
All parliaments of the world, all people and parties should say: violence
has failed. We are ending the century with advanced technology but also
with very advanced forms of rapid destruction. It has been a century of
war, of suffering, of violation of human rights and it is still so today. The
coming generations must be allowed to enjoy life in a culture of peace and
dialogue. We have to be convinced the mission of UNESCO is feasible.
Only by fulfilling that mission, by building peace in the minds of men and
women, will we prevent future generations from knowing the horror of
war (Mayor, Speech to International Conference on Culture of Peace and
Governance, 1997).
In this speech, Mayor is referring to clearly established concepts that knowledge
and peace are inseparably linked. More importantly, he continues to preach the
doctrine of the promises made in 1945, when UNESCO was founded. The
premise is that the founders got it right, but that UNESCO and the nations of the
world had failed to see the value (especially during the NWICO years). This is
another reference to the appearance/reality pair and more strongly reinforces the
links to the new reality. Clearly, Mayor is continuing, and strengthening the
ideology he established in the early years of his tenure – continuing to invoke the
universal audience he called into being years before.
Likewise, Executive Board meetings continually evaluated UNESCO’s progress
during this second phase of returning to its mandate. Logically, those meetings also
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evaluated progress towards convincing the departed member states to return. But all
documents appear to indicate that the chief architect in this new vision was Mayor,
himself.
Mayor succeeded in 1990 in getting both the U.S. and the U.K. to perform an
evaluation of UNESCO for the purpose of gauging how close these states might be to
returning. While the results were not what Mayor was hoping for, they do indicate clearly
that phase two in Crawford’s model is in full swing. The evidence makes clear that the
organization's direction has noticeably changed, but also that not all member states have
accepted the new direction. This concern and some others prompted both countries to
resist, for the time being at least, renewed membership in UNESCO. The UNESCO
archives contain copies of correspondence between Mayor and the U.S. Observer
Mission at UNESCO that confirm this fact. When Mayor was informed of this decision,
he was also sent a copy of a report drafted by U.S. officials who had undertaken an
independent evaluation of UNESCO. This report is also found in the archives and
contains independent confirmation, from outside the organization, that a second
argumentative phase is underway.
In the report, the U.S. explains the reasons it withdrew in the first place and
describes the perceived success this withdrawal has had so far on UNESCO policy. It
concludes that returning to membership so soon after leaving would invalidate its
previous stance and likely result in reversal of the positive changes so recently enacted:
“While United States non-membership has spurred some reform activity at UNESCO,
there is much more that needs to be accomplished in order for UNESCO to be considered
as the organization intended by its founders” (Miller, 1990). The report also refers to the
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recent U.K. decision not to seek reentry as confirming evidence that the U.S. position is
appropriate.
The report also specifically recognizes that UNESCO has begun a process of
change – beginning with the DG. “The Director General has made known his desire to
see UNESCO reformed. We are confident that he is sincere in his expressions of desire to
see the United States rejoin the organization. UNESCO has not succeeded, however, in
translating his assurances into concrete measures of reform” (Miller, 1990). The report
then mentions a number of issues illustrative of U.S. concern with respect to activities at
UNESCO, mostly concerning budgetary and management issues, which one might add
have subsequently proved inconsequential to the larger issues at hand (and, in fact, these
concerns remain even to this day).
Two of these issues, however, are of vital relevance as they provide evidence of
phase two in Crawford’s model as applied to UNESCO. The first of these issues (and
least important, though related indirectly to NWICO) concerns the U.S. perception that
UNESCO is anti-Israel and supportive of the PLO. The document claims that UNESCO
resolutions have been heavily biased against Israel and, “often based on false
accusations,” have continued to be adopted even after though the organization itself has
tried to distance itself from the NWICO years – continued evidence (according to the
U.S.) that the U.S. voice will be drowned out by a persistent majority of developing
nations speaking from ideologically charged positions. The report cites this as evidence
that the organization has not fully succeeded in its change in direction. In fact, later on,
the document goes so far as to say that, “The leverage we retain as a sought-after nonmember in some instances is greater than we would wield simply by being one vote
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among 161 others” (Miller, 1990). The report also cites the appointment of a high-level
“Coordinator for Cooperation with Palestine” as an example of UNESCO giving special
status to Palestine – which wasn’t even a recognized state - exceeding that of any
member state (Miller, 1990).
The second issue the report offers as an example is the issue of communication –
the critical matter raised by NWICO. The report states that the U.S. is “deeply
concerned” about palpable similarities which is says exists between the current text on
communications and the documents which proceeded it over a fifteen year span. It states
that additional references have been inserted regarding freedom and independence of the
press, but says that it is “undeniable that critical elements to which the United States most
strongly objected in the past are still present,” and that the UNESCO program on
communications remains one in which freedom of the press and of expression are
balanced against the desires of governments to control the flow of information to and
from their citizens. Recall that this was a crucial goal for the U.S. in combating
communist ideology – still a sore spot in 1990.
The following quote from the document has the most relevance to this discussion:
Moreover, the so-called New World Information and Communication
Order is still perceived by the Third World UNESCO delegates as an
‘article of faith’ with them and as ‘a continuing and evolving process’
(Miller, 1990).
This quote shows that while UNESCO had begun to deconstruct its association with
NWICO, the message had not, as yet, fully reached critical mass with all of its
membership. Perhaps this is due to the continued presence of the Cold War, but more
likely it is evidence that the phases defined by Crawford are valid and that this one had
not quite surpassed phase two and that policy changes were still in their infancy related to
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this new direction.
The report concludes with bulleted points adopted by Congress as official policy
with regard to UNESCO. While nearly all these points have been reviewed earlier in this
chapter, one bullet point confirms that the Soviet Union – through Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze – had taken responsibility for much of the “exaggerated ideological
approach” that undermined tolerance intrinsic to UNESCO, and expressed the U.S. hope
that Soviet policy would improve in this regard as a result. I take this point as offering
confirming evidence that Cold War ideological pressure itself was not the sole cause of
the U.S. withdrawal – and that by the same token the promise of improved Soviet policy
also was not enough to prompt a U.S. return.
Executive Board documents from 1990-1992 show that discussion took place
within the UNESCO leadership about the organization's direction. It is quickly apparent
to any reader that much less contention then existed within the leadership, and this after
less than five years change in the DG. The progress toward convincing the U.S. to return
to membership is still a frequent topic, but mostly the discussion centers on other policy
matters – and, importantly, how these efforts fit the overall goals of the organization.
At the same time, public speeches given by Mayor continued to utilize the same
language as before – that is putting emphasis on themes that were much more universally
acceptable – and all completely avoiding charged themes. The language used in every
speech is laced with tones of cooperation and mutual benefit – always referring back to
the UNESCO Constitution, the founders of UNESCO, or similar language used by
prominent people for the audience to whom he is speaking.
Nearly as important as the words used in the speeches is the frequency of
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speaking engagements taken on by Mayor – and the diversity of audiences to whom he
spoke. During this time, Mayor accepted nearly twice as many speaking invitations as he
had in the previous two years. Many of these engagements were in the U.S. or U.K. –
reflective of his continuing great effort to reach as many in the most relevant countries to
his agenda as he could. Mayor spoke to associations of scientists and appealed to their
desire to collaborate scientifically with the rest of the world. He spoke to press
associations and appealed to their desire for greater freedom of the press and protection
from censorship by telling them about the many initiatives UNESCO had accomplished
(or planned to tackle). He spoke to advocacy groups about their areas of interest. He
spoke to at the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
and praised the Americans who helped start the projects on world heritage, while also
speaking of how much UNESCO had planned to continue this important project. Always
he used language tied to UNESCO’s foundation and associated that language with current
or planned efforts. However, now, nearly missing from every speech were references to
the departure of the U.S. It appears that Mayor made his big push immediately after
taking office and let the arguments about UNESCO’s progress speak for themselves.
In speeches to the UNESCO General Conference, Mayor consistently spoke of all
nations coming to the table to work for a common goal. Gone were the references to
budgetary fallout from the U.S. departure. Resource shortage was still mentioned, but this
was seldom connected to the U.S. absence. This is a technique used to distance UNESCO
from any self-served interest in brining back the U.S. into membership. That they needed
U.S. monetary contributions and had to do more with less was a foregone conclusion and
pointing to that fact only associated the new direction to attempts to bring the U.S. back.
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In 1992 the U.S. had a change in the presidency with the Republicans, who
opposed UNESCO, being replaced by Democrats in the White House under Bill Clinton.
It was also during this time that the end of the Cold War began to be much more of a
reality than a dream. All this attachment to UNESCO’s foundation – without attachment
to the U.S. return – was necessary to drive home the point to the universal audience
(particularly the developing nations who once supported NWICO) that this course of
action would be more productive and that NWICO was no longer a topic of discussion.
In interviews with Mayor, he often referred to this period as the first sign that a
U.S. return might be a real possibility. Mayor cultivated a close association with Clinton
and worked hard to provide whatever the new American president needed regarding
UNESCO. It was during this period that major programs that were directly tied to the
foundation of UNESCO were started. Multiple initiatives for human rights were
conceived during this time period – most of which finally came to fruition around the
year 2000 in connection with the Millennial Declaration of Human Rights. Such a
working relationship led to what Mayor said was an “agreement from President Clinton
that the U.S. would return to membership in UNESCO as soon as logistically possible”
(Mayor, Former Director General of UNESCO, 2007). Mayor referred to a letter he
received from Clinton in which Clinton recognizes the progress UNESCO has made and,
more importantly, the ideals it stands for. He said that in the letter, Clinton promised a
return to UNESCO, but hinted that return might not be possible under the Republicancontrolled Congress who would have to approve the return since a return meant
budgetary expenditures. By Mayor’s accounting, all the proof of ideological change in
UNESCO had been accomplished in the eyes of his administration by the year 1998, but
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the major hurdle would be proof of better management to justify investing American
money in the organization once again – and that proof was mostly demanded by
Republicans in Congress.
What we can see through the documents is that between 1990, when the U.S.
refused to return, and 1999 at the end of Mayor’s time as DG of UNESCO, the rhetoric of
universality and getting back to the foundational principles had fully set in and become
embraced. This is not only the case with the specific particular audience of the U.S.
government, but also the case with the general membership inside UNESCO.
While it cannot be proven that all member companies gave up on their desires of
NWICO and accepted wholly the new direction dictated by the UNESCO Constitution a
few things lead us to that logical conclusion. First, there is a distinct absence of
contention in the Executive Board – something that hadn’t been the case almost since the
organization was founded – meanwhile the board spoke often and openly about the new
direction and the progress in recovering former member states. Second, the language of
dissociation from UNESCO virtually disappeared during this time. No longer was
UNESCO openly trying to distance itself from NWICO so much as it was trying to
establish its new course. It spent less time overtly defending the legitimacy of its change
– through techniques like constantly speaking of only working in its area of competence –
and more time promoting what it actually was doing. It spent less time defending
budgetary practices – and what it could not do – and more time speaking about what it
actually could do. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, all the voting on medium and
long-term plans for the organization passed rather easily through the general membership
with only regional quarrels rather than large scale ideological ones.
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And so we come to the point in time, where I argue that this argumentation
process shifts from Crawford’s second phase to that of the third phase – the phase in
which more concrete policy begins to take shape. This is the phase in which the balance
of capabilities between the previously dominant norm (those associated with NWICO)
began to change in favor of the newly suggested norm (or in this case, re-suggested,
because it was suggested, though never truly acted upon, after World War II). A major
point in this argument is the fact that the U.K. made the decision to return to membership
in 1997, saying that UNESCO had truly reformed and that the world was embracing that
reform. But the key point in favor of this argument is the changing of Directors General
at UNESCO in 1999.
Phase Three: Vision Turns to Action
In 1999, the UNESCO Executive Board elected Koichiro Matsuura, from Japan,
as the new Director General of UNESCO. Although Executive Board documents for this
won’t be accessible for another nine years and thus we can only access individual
accounts of the event, all indications were that this was a move not to change the
ideology of UNESCO, but to provide more efficient management of the organization.
One person working at UNESCO, and present for this transition, spoke of the change.
“Ideology of UNESCO didn’t change when Matsuura took over, in fact it hasn’t changed
to this day. But the leadership was looking for someone who could provide credibility in
management without giving up our principles. Many felt Mayor had sufficient time to
make change and had done so in ideology, but wasn’t doing so in management.”
(Coutelle, 2009) Given the U.S. concerns about management of resources (and
accusations of cronyism), and the need to improve in this area to eliminate it as a reason

108

for the U.S. to remain apart, the change to Matsuura was a logical step.
If the UNESCO case is to continue to map on to Crawford’s three phases of
change, this third phase must be characterized not only by a continuance of the new
ideology, but also by the beginning of policy changes and more concrete action
supporting the newly accepted ideology. The installation of Matsuura as DG, along with
his subsequent public acceptance of the organization’s ideological direction evidences the
beginning of this third phase. Coutelle’s comments indicated a growing sense that not
enough was being done tangibly to pursue this accepted ideology. And so, UNESCO
brings on what it deemed the embodiment of efficient policy management – Matsuura. To
map UNESCO to Crawford’s model – third phase – we also need to show some action
being taken.
To show how Matsuura’s election as DG signals the beginning of the third phase
(along with his embracing the established ideology), I will examine his inaugural speech
at the UNESCO General Conference in 1999. Matsuura’s speech at his installation as
DG demonstrated two things: a commitment to continue the ideological direction
established by his predecessor, and an absolute determination to slim down and make
more effective the programs overseen by UNESCO – both of which are critical to map
this case to Crawford’s model.
As to the ideological direction, Matsuura, made it clear he was going to pursue the
exact same course as Mayor – with his own particular flair. His speech spoke of his
childhood witnessing the horrors of war in Japan – and how this made him determined to
seek a life of public service and commitment to avoid such travesties. He spoke directly
to multiple cultures as he told of his appreciation for all cultures. He quoted texts from
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different religious backgrounds. Then he spoke of the current needs of the world with
which UNESCO had competency, specifically mentioning literacy, education, poverty,
overpopulation, science and communication. He links these with the vision of the
founders of UNESCO. “Of course our world picture should not be painted so dark. Since
1946, much headway has been made. The prophetic creators of UNESCO foresaw the
foundations of our world body becoming ever more democratic: that is, enshrining ‘the
democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect’ of all human beings, as
stated in the founding document” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO General Conference,
1999).
Matsuura goes on to speak about how much potential UNESCO has to aid the
progress of globalization by being a source of answers to the challenges globalization
presents. He speaks as well of an international community as being an important part of
the answers the world needs. This is parallel to the audience Mayor worked so hard to
convince during his tenure.
Then Matsuura goes into the area of his special focus – that of management. “But
criticisms, not all of them unfair, have been leveled against this great instrument: and
failings, where verified, must be made good. The purpose of sound management is, again,
no end in itself, but a duty: to ensure that our institution fully discharges its great task as a
true world service, responsible and accountable to the world – and to the world’s
taxpayers” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO General Conference, 1999).
Plainly, the new DG was ready to follow the establish course of his predecessor –
though he intended to do so in a more efficient manner. Although the election of
Matsuura was relatively without controversy, his immediate actions upon taking office
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were not. Mayor was a popular leader among UNESCO personnel and interviews with
those present at that time confirmed simply that his ideology had become effective and
accepted nearly universally. Thus, when Matsuura dismissed 20 senior advisers and
suspended more than 120 promotions and appointments that his predecessor put in place
before he left, it cause a great deal of tension inside UNESCO headquarters. The moves
provoked staff protests and even a short hunger strike. But Matsuura knew these moves
would be contentious – and his speech directly to the Secretariat office reflected his
awareness of the strain his moves would cause. But the speech also reflects the depth of
the acceptance Mayor’s ideology had gained.
This speech to the Secretariat – over which the DG presides – was intended to
unite the organization behind the values it already believed in, while at the same time
make them aware of some drastic administrative decisions that had to be made. In an air
of unprecedented openness, Matsuura introduced himself to the staff and spoke of his
dedication to the ideals that UNESCO stands for. He also connected with many of them
by calling France his “second home” where his two sons were born. He then called upon
the collective values of the staff. “Let us think about what our collective strength
represents – the strength of collective intelligence, our know-how and, above all, our
conviction. I know that you are all still totally devoted to the ideals of UNESCO, even if
lately some of you have questioned them in light of fear of cutbacks. Let us try to think
together what our potential, without these fears, could achieve if it were all concentrated
in the same direction” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO Secretariat, 1999). He then
proceeds to tell them that the member states – their acknowledged bosses – have
demanded some order be put into “the House.” He refers to the challenges the staff has
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faced with cutbacks, lack of resources, and – brazenly admits – from “a lack of authority,
to use the word in its true sense.”
At no time does he deny the direction Mayor has taken the organization – in fact
he professes to believe in it and encourages others not to stray from it. He unites both the
ideological ground and the need for better management practices by saying that, “and yet
– and here is the whole mystery of this Organization and its mission so well articulated
by my predecessor – you still believe in it. I must tell you that I also believe in it. There is
something here, in UNESCO, that is unique, outstanding and magical, which can spur
people in unprecedented efforts. To achieve our goal, however, we must trust first in
common sense, justice, order, balance and responsibility. I hope to add these principles to
the ones that have united us for the past decade” (Matsuura, Speech to UNESCO
Secretariat, 1999). Clearly there is evidence of the work previous principles of
argumentation have accomplished in brining UNESCO into a place where it was much
more likely to accomplish the return of the U.S. to membership. We see in the previous
words evidence that phase two has been achieved and that the organization is ready for
organized policy to result out of the new beliefs.
The rest of Matsuura’s speech details changes that are to come – requesting the
support of the Secretariat in some of the painful changes that will be to come. But he
closes with his reference to the audience that is critical in the goal to convince the U.S. to
return to membership. “I wish to reaffirm my commitment, taken before the Member
States in General Conference, in this very hall, to serve the international community to
the utmost of my ability, in accordance with the Constitution of UNESCO” (Matsuura,
Speech to UNESCO Secretariat, 1999).
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These speeches are used purely as examples to map this time period, beginning
with the installation of Matsuura, to the third phase in Crawford’s model. There is no
longer much evidence of the more elaborate argumentation campaign directed at the
United States specifically during these speeches. As I have argued earlier, the success of
that campaign left little doubt in the minds of most of the international community that a
U.S. return to UNESCO was inevitable. As such, most of Matsuura’s speeches continued
accepting the same ideology as Mayor, but focused much more on practical policy issues
designed to be the final argument in the case for a U.S. return.
Which leaves us with only the task of showing the policy moves related to the
foundational language of UNESCO – essential to Crawford’s third phase. It would be a
lengthy task indeed to outline all policies and documents UNESCO produced during a
single year – let alone during the tenure of a single DG. Nevertheless, there are a few
very noteworthy policies that came out of UNESCO during the latter part of Mayor’s
tenure, but more specifically, during Matsuura’s tenure, which separate this period from
previous ones. If Mayor’s tenure could be described as one of many public speeches
attempting to define the organization, Matsuura’s tenure could just as easily be defined as
one of many official declarations and policy implementation.
One policy directly related to this new ideology is the “Declaration and Program
of Action for a Culture of Peace” mentioned earlier. This is based on the document
Mayor tasked Adams to complete in the early part of his tenure. The fruits of these labors
began to appear just as Mayor was leaving office. In October, 1999 UNESCO came out
with the official document accepted by the General Conference. That same month, it was
presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations and ratified. This document
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officially recognized UN resolutions UNESCO had worked hard to pass – specifically the
proclamation that the year 2000 would be the “International Year for the Culture of
Peace” and that the decade 2000-2010 would be the “International Decade for a Culture
of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World.” This UNESCO document –
ratified by the U.N. – defined a culture of peace and gave policy recommendations for
member nations to enact in order to foster a culture of peace. This was a comprehensive
document. It gave suggestions in the following areas: fostering a culture of peace through
education, promote sustainable economic development and social development, promote
respect for human rights, ensure equality between women and men, foster democratic
participation, advance understanding, tolerance and solidarity, support participatory
communication and the free flow of information and knowledge, and to promote
international peace and security. The document took each of these areas and gave specific
examples of how states could implement the concepts. To the eye of the informed
observer, this document represents the center of the argumentative campaign to convince
the U.S. to return – at least insofar as ideology is concerned.
Another policy move taken at roughly this same time period (1999-2000) is the
formation of the UNESCO “Department of Education for a Culture of Peace.” This
UNESCO group was tasked with overseeing all activities related to the International
Decade proclamation mentioned earlier. Adams was appointed to lead this group.
In 2002, UNESCO implemented a strategy for an international program on
democracy. The overall theme of the democracy program is “democracy, culture and
peace.” It contains three main areas of action: fostering comparative analytical research
on democracy and its relationship to culture; organizing international dialogues and
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prospective analysis on the future of democracy; and supporting democracy in postconflict societies.
Many other programs were formed in the years immediately following Matsuura’s
installation as DG. In 2000, UNESCO formed the Human Rights Program, including a
program for gender equality and another for the advancement of human rights. In 2004,
UNESCO sponsored the first world forum on the Advancement of human rights. Also
during this time period, UNESCO added to the Philosophy forum Mayor had started by
hosting a “philosophy day.” The first was held at UNESCO headquarters in 2002. Shortly
thereafter, UNESCO started the Network of Women Philosophers. Other specific
resolutions or programs enacted during this time period include programs on poverty
eradication, HIV prevention, the fight against discrimination, and the education of
children in need.
The list of programs implemented directly attached to UNESCO’s foundational
mandate during this period is substantial and represents the fruits of the philosophical
labors started by Mayor. Clearly, 1999 to the present shows significant progress needed
to map a third stage in Crawford’s model. The trend continues even today. The formation
of an “Alliance of Civilizations,” multiple projects on world heritage, and initiatives
UNESCO is involved with such as the World Summit for the Information Society, all
show action and movement on UNESCO’s goals that were missing during (and
immediately following) the NWICO years.
All of this leads up to the period in which sufficient momentum in the
argumentation campaign to convince the U.S. to return to membership had been
achieved.
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CHAPTER 5
Implications and Conclusion
After a long struggle, UNESCO accomplished its goal of convincing the U.S. to
return to membership in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The decision was
welcomed by the international community and, though expected, the timing was a bit
surprising to many journalists and members of the international community who had seen
the U.S. pursue unilateralist policies ever since its departure in 1985. In fact, the pursuit
of unilateral foreign policy had only increased in the years leading up to the U.S. return –
and would continue with the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The international community greeted the U.S. announcement that it would return
to UNESCO as a positive indicator of American interest in international endeavors.
Announcing the move, Bush utilized language derived directly from the UNESCO
foundation as he spoke to the UN. “America will participate fully in its mission to
advance human rights, tolerance and learning” (Bush, 2002). Bush acknowledged that
UNESCO had reformed its finances, bureaucracy and political focus to be a leaner, more
efficient organization – and gave credit for the changes to Matsuura, although the
ideological direction UNESCO had taken clearly had commenced under the tenure of
Mayor.
UNESCO organized a targeted argumentative campaign to induce the United
States to return to membership. It made a concerted effort to dissociate itself from the
contentious ideology of the NWICO years and associate itself with more widely accepted
ideology of its charter. All the documents analyzed from the years during which the
United States absence was most heavily argued indicate that Neta Crawford's model
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applies in the case of UNESCO. From the position of a communication scholar and a
constructivist in international relations, there is already an abundance of evidence that the
argumentation used by UNESCO was successful in its ultimate goal.
The problem, seen from the perspective of traditional international relations
scholarship, is that it is finally impossible to prove that UNESCO’s change in ideology
and argumentation convinced the U.S. government that a return was in its best interest.
The counter-claim would be that the U.S. found some tactical advantage in returning –
that it stood to gain substantially by a return. In fact, some IR scholars might argue that
the U.S. returned in order to offset the outcry its unilateral actions against Iraq would
soon provoke. But this is where Krebs’ model is so insightful – and where the documents
examined in this dissertation help to reveal rhetorical elements that might not have been
noticed otherwise by traditional scholars of international relations.
Krebs points to three parties involved in his model – a claimant (UNESCO), an
opposition (the U.S. government), and an audience to whom both parties must appeal. I
have argued that the audience, as applied to Krebs’ model in this case, was the wider
international community. UNESCO's leadership, especially its Director General (Mayor)
went to great lengths to invoke this audience – along the lines of Chaim Perelman’s
concept of a “universal audience.” I have also argued that Matsuura took great care to
maintain the existence of this audience – both by calling upon it in his inaugural speech,
and by acknowledging it in his communication to his Secretariat. In fact, Matsuura
counted upon the existence and cohesiveness of this audience to combat the opposition he
would face upon implementation of staff cutbacks. His attempts were intended to build
on this ideology – already existent and long agreed to by many in the international
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community – by adding to it a sense of competent management, which was the only
remaining item of contention expressed by the U.S. government.
Perhaps the best argument in favor of the existence of such a universal audience –
and that UNESCO has succeeded in changing the normative beliefs of this audience – is
the return of the U.K. to membership in 1997. In interviews with Mayor, he frequently
expressed regret that he was unable to achieve the U.S. return during his tenure. But he
said the course he commenced eventually resulted in a U.S. return, and he proudly spoke
of the return of the U.K. as convincing evidence that there was hope for the universal
ideals he clearly holds. “Maybe the United States didn’t officially come back to
membership while I was Director General. But I have letters signed by many U.S.
government leaders saying that they would return as soon as it were possible to pass the
action through the Congress. This, to me, is nearly as good as a return – even if it
happened after I left. It was just politics stopping a return. But England came back much
earlier, so we must have gotten something right. They, perhaps, just didn’t have as strong
a conservative resistance” (Mayor, 2009).
In fact, while outside the scope of this dissertation, a study of the return of the
U.K. to UNESCO might be nearly as valuable as the current work. In documents at
UNESCO headquarters, correspondence between Mayor and U.K. government officials
clearly point to the existence of a wider international normative consensus to which the
U.K. felt it had to respond. “It is evident in the decade since we left UNESCO, that
substantial progress has taken place in eliminating politicization in UNESCO policy. Its
leadership clearly supports the free flow of information, but more impressively seems to
have the international community galvanized behind initiatives in its area of competence.
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Since we have always believed in these goals, we feel compelled to participate fully in
UNESCO’s future” (Howell, 1997). Although the letter also insisted that budgetary and
management principles still required resolution, it said that the U.K. was willing to help
with reform from within rather than as an outsider. In fact, the letter said that the work
UNESCO was beginning to accomplish was “too important” to allow it to continue
without British input as a member.
If, then, this audience had been called into action, and a major nation like the U.K.
used its existence as a reason for returning, it stands to reason that the same might also be
true of the United States. Why, then, would the U.S. wait five more years to return? The
answer to this question is quite complex. First, one must recognize the substantial
opposition to anything associated with the U.N. (e.g., Shawn, 2006) exists to this day in
the United States. Much of this opposition is focused on the dubious management and
budgets of UN organizations – and in many cases is well justified. This alone can help
explain the delay in rejoining until a Director General was elected who appeared to set
things in order. As late as only one year prior to the United States' return to UNESCO, it
was still reporting lack of progress in this regard (Schaefer, 2001), but even this fact may
only provide further evidence of the power of argumentation.
The U.S. returned even despite concerns over how its money would be spent. It
recognized the position UNESCO had placed it in by reforming its ideology. The mere
fact that a Director General perceived as competent in this area was overseeing the
reform proved finally enough for the U.S. government. This move eliminated the last leg
the U.S. had to stand upon if it wanted to continue to remain apart from UNESCO. It is
important to recall that this was part of the strategy of the Executive Board when it
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elected Matsuura. This pressure of budgetary concerns in U.N. affiliated organizations
was not nearly so prevalent in the U.K., which tends to be less unilateral in policy than
the U.S.
Second, the U.S. likely waited longer than the U.K. to return because it saw a
need to time a return to gain maximum advantage. Previously cited documents have
pointed to a U.S. desire to gain the most it could out of a return – even though the
decision was widely recognized as inevitable. “The United States had been edging back
toward the Paris-based organization since the Clinton administration, but the Bush team
chose its moment to focus maximum international attention on the formal reconciliation”
(Fitchett, 2002). This is also evidentiary of the U.S. recognizing the presence and power
of the international community. It wanted to focus as much attention as possible from the
international community upon this move, a fact confirmed by the chosen announcement
date, on the one-year anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
What we have, then, is a U.S. government “coerced,” or at least nudged, by
international pressure into a decision to return. This decision was essentially taken during
the Clinton administration, as Mayor has stated in interviews, but acted upon at a time
most beneficial to the U.S. image. The return was heralded by the international
community as a sign of hope that the U.S. could sit at the same table and dialogue with
people whose views it found distasteful – all of which signifying that UNESCO’s efforts
to change the direction of international dialogue were successful. It is also a case in
which Krebs’ model for coercion appears to apply on a larger scale than even he
intended. Perhaps this is an isolated example of his model on a worldwide stage – or
perhaps there may be other examples to be found.
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All this raises an important final question: If UNESCO (or other international
organizations) has the power to shape the global agenda through their argumentation, to
set that agenda in motion, to rally the international community (which we have seen to
hold a measure of influence) behind its agenda, and in the process bring on board nations
who have reason to object, what more might it be able to accomplish within its areas of
competence? Could it achieve true international cooperation in environmental concerns
by using the same principles of argumentation – trackable through the stages of
Crawford’s model? What about scientific endeavors? Many documents in UNESCO
archives hint that catastrophes like tsunamis could be mitigated if all nations were able to
coordinate and share data properly. What about the challenges of cultural diversity?
Could UNESCO employ the same methods to bring everyone together on the contentious
issue of intellectual property? The possibilities for international consensus are
considerable.
This research is but a beginning in what promises to be a fertile field of
investigation. It offers contribution to many fields of study. One significant contribution
is offered to both scholars of argumentation and scholars of international relations. This
contribution is seen in the discussion of the universal audience. To scholars of
argumentation, the application of the universal audience in this research is something that
warrants further exploration. For Perelman, the universal audience is constituted only in
the mind of the speaker. However, this research has shown that UNESCO, beginning
with Mayor, invoked a universal audience made up of members of the international
community and associated with UNESCO. In fact, the language of UNESCO’s Charter
invokes this audience and was used effectively by Mayor (and later by Matsuura) to great
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effect. This audience is referred to numerous times in the speeches of both directors
general. The idea that a universal audience could be constituted more concretely than in
the mind of the speaker is worth exploration.
To international relations scholars, the universal audience is a noteworthy
contribution to the work of scholars like Krebs. Recall that Krebs says his model is valid
mostly on smaller scale cases (regional, or perhaps smaller nations) as opposed to the
complexities of international organizations. The presence of a universal audience could
increase the scale to which Krebs’ model may be applied. This research also adds to the
growing body of work by constructivists struggling to gain increased credibility in a field
dominated by realists and liberalists. It gives added weight to social and rhetorical
elements usually rejected by these traditions. It fits well into the research done by Barnett
staking a claim for the power of social and rhetorical elements in international
organizations.
Also, this study is a valid contribution to scholars of both international relations
and argumentation because it is an example of an organization that changed the rules.
Specifically, Mayor succeeded in changing the standards by which UNESCO was to be
judged. His use of argumentation ingeniously, and subtly changes the rules. Before,
UNESCO was judged by the standards of the time – sustainable development. This was
how the organization was judged by the majority. States looked at UNESCO as
successful in terms of how it could help member states develop – and states came to the
table at UNESCO expecting as much. UNESCO’s pursuit of the policies associated with
NWICO (and most of the MacBride Report) are evidence of this. Mayor succeeded in
changing how UNESCO was to be judged. Cleverly, he got the organization and the
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international community to shift its focus away from member states (at least beyond mere
membership) and on the individuals that made up those member states. He had the
language of the UNESCO Constitution to back him in this endeavor. This language,
which says, “that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic
arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous,
lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore
be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.”
Cleverly removes the focus from politicized elements associated with governments of
states and places it squarely upon individual people. He spoke many times of how states
are really just made up of many individuals and that “to change states, we need to change
individuals.” In this manner, Mayor changed the rules on how UNESCO would be
judged. Doing so astutely removed from UNESCO all possibility of being politicized.
Doing so also took issues of budget and spending out of focus. This is significant for both
argumentation and international relations scholars.
To the field of international communication, this research offers a more fitting
conclusion to the NWICO years, which simply faded out of the picture. It could serve as
a starting point for any research looking to track where those issues stand today. In
addition, this research could open up new applications for the use of framing theory. The
framing of arguments to the point where a superpower can be swayed is an intriguing
possibility.
Areas for future research
There are many avenues for future research based on the work in this dissertation.
Perhaps the next step would be to do an analysis of mass media accounts of the
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withdrawal and return of the U.S. The intent of this research would be to see if the
formation of the universal audience, as well as the strategies of dissociation were picked
up by the main-stream media. Was the rhetoric picked up in the same way as in
communication coming from UNESCO? Along the same lines would be to study
communication within the U.S. Congress to track how this rhetoric was picked up and
used. Were there any references made to the universal audience?
Also, though this is not an exhaustive list of possibilities for future research, it
would be a valuable quest to examine the U.K. return to membership in the same way –
and to compare with findings about the U.S. return. The same holds true for the departure
and return of Singapore. The argumentation used at UNESCO held that the participation
of all countries is important to the organization’s mission. It would be fascinating to look
at strategies (if any) used to convince Singapore to return (which happened only recently,
in 2008).
Finally, it seems of value to examine other international organizations struggling
for acceptance – or embroiled in controversy – to see how they are positioning
themselves with respect to a potential universal audience. A couple of organizations that
come to immediate attention to communication scholars would include the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO). WIPO, in particular, would be of interest to communication scholars tracking
issues of intellectual property and culture.
In my opinion, this type of research is particularly suited to UNESCO as an
organization because rhetorical and argumentation analyses are the best tools to evaluate
a forum organization. Dialogue between nations is at the heart of UNESCO, and what

124

better tools to track dialogue than those communications scholars bring to the table? In a
world facing tough challenges, of which many are within UNESCO’s areas of
competency, continued evaluation of dialogue may provide even further insight into how
international organizations can play an increased role in shaping the world.

125

REFERENCES
Agathangelou, A. M.; Ling, L H M. (2004). The House of IR: From Family
Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism. International Studies Review 6 (4):21-49.
Alleyne, M.D., (2002). America back with UNESCO. West Africa. November 4-10,
2002, Pgs. 20-21.
Alleyne, M. D. (2003). Global Lies? Propaganda, the UN and World Order.
New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
Alleyne, M.D., (1997). News Revolution: Political and Economic Decisions About
Global Information. New York: St. Martin’s.
Alliance of Civilizations (2008). Web page: http://www.pnac.es
Alisky, M. (1988). The News Flow from South America Sometimes is a trickle. Journal
of Popular Culture. Summer: 22 pp. 7-8.
Appadurai, A. (1990). Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. Theory,
Culture and Society, 7:295-310.
Appadurai, A. (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Ashworth, L.M. & Long, D. (1999). New Perspectives on International Functionalism.
New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.
Barnett, M. N. (1997). The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda.
Cultural Anthropology , 12 (4), 551-578.
Bokova, I. (2009, November 12). UNESCO Director General Mission Statement.
Retrieved June 21, 2010 from UNESCO: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/aboutus/who-we-are/director-general/mission-statement/
Brown, C., (2001). Fog in channel: continental IR theory isolated. In R. Crawford and D.
Jarvis, eds. International relations – still an American social science? Towards diversity
in international thought. Albany: State University Press, 203-219.
Campbell, D., (1998). Writing Security. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Coate, R. A. (1989). Unilateralism, Ideology and US Foreign Policy: The United States
in and out of UNESCO. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Consoli, J. (1987). Latin Americans Seek ‘Cultural Journalism.’ Editor & Publisher,
May 23, 120, pp. 16.

126

Coutelle, A. (2009, July 30). UNESCO Archivist. (J. Johnson, Interviewer)
Crawford, N. (2002). Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decoloization,
and Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Derrida, J. (1994). Specters of Marx : the state of the debt, the work of mourning, and the
New international, New York : Routledge
Doty, R.L., (1996), The logic of difference in international relations – U.S. colonization
of the Phillipines. In: F.A. Beer and R Hariman, eds. Post-Realism – the rhetorical turn
in international relations. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 331-345.
Dutt, S. (1999). The Role of Intellectuals and Non-governmental Organizations in
Britain’s Relations with UNESCO. Round Table, no. 350, April. Pp. 207-28.
Entman, R.M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of
Communication, Autumn 1993, 43, 4, pg. 51
Fischer, F. and Forrester, J. (1993). The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and
Planning, Duke University Press, Durham and London.
Fitchett, J. (2002, September 13). Europeans Welcome Bush's Decision on UNESCO.
International Herald Tribune , p. 4.
Fox, J. (2005). Unpacking "Transnational Citizenship". Annual Review of
Political Science 8:171-201.
Fukuyama, F. (1993). The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, New York,
New York.
Groom, A.J.R. & Taylor (Eds.) (1975). Functionalism: theory and practice in
international relations. NY: Crane, Russak.
Hajer, M. cited in Fischer, F. and Forrester, J. (1993). The Argumentative Turn in Policy
Analysis and Planning, Duke University Press, Durham and London.
Hart, R. P. (1997). Modern Rhetorical Criticism. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Harvey, D., (1989) The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hoggart, R. (1978), An Idea and its Servants: UNESCO from Within, Chatto and Windus,
London.
Howell, D. (1997). Letter to Federico Mayor, Director General of UNESCO. UK House
of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee. Paris: UNESDOC.

127

Huntington, S. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, New York, 72:3
Huxley, J. (1947). UNESCO: Its Purpose and its Philosophy. Public Affairs Press .
Imber, M.F., (1990). The USA, ILO, UNESCO and IAEA: politicization and withdrawal
in the specialized agencies, London, Macmillan for Centre for International Policy
Studies, Southampton.
Kennedy, P. (2006). The Parliament of Man: Past Present, and Future of the United
Nations, Random House, New York, N.Y.
Ki-moon, B. (2008). Secretary-General of the United Nations, as quoted in the New York
Times, Jan. 16, 2008, late edition, Section A, pg. 9.
Krebs, R. R., & Jackson, P. T. (2007). Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power
of Political Rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations , 13 (1), 35-66.
Lent, J. A. (1977). Foreign News in American Media. Journal of Communication,
Winter, pp. 49.
Masmoudi, M. (1979). The New World Information Order. Journal of Communication,
Spring 29, pp. 172-173.
Matsuura, K. (1999). Speech to UNESCO General Conference. UNESDOC. Paris:
UNESCO.
Matsuura, K. (1999). Speech to UNESCO Secretariat. UNESDOC. Paris: UNESCO.
Mayor, F. (2007, July 21). Former Director General of UNESCO. (J. Johnson,
Interviewer, & J. Johnson, Translator)
Mayor, F. (2009, August 7). Former Director-General of UNESCO. Interview. (J.
Johnson, Interviewer)
Mayor, F. (1987). Speech to General Conference of UNESCO. UNESDOC (pp. 1-9).
Paris: UNESCO.
Mayor, F. (1997). Speech to International Conference on Culture of Peace and
Governance. UNESDOC (pp. 1-4). Maputo: UNESCO.
Mayor, F. (1995). Speech to UNESCO Philosophy Forum. UNESDOC (pp. 1-5). Paris:
UNESCO.
Mayor, F. (1988). Speech to U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. UNESDCO. New York:
UNESCO.
M'Bow, A. (1985). Speech to General assembly of UNESCO. UNESDOC. Paris:
UNESCO.

128

Merle, M. (1987). The Sociology of International Relations. Leamington Spa: Berg.
Miller, R. T. (1990). U.S. Observer Mission report on UNESCO progress. U.S. Observer
Mission to UNESCO. Paris: UNESDOC.
McKeon, R. (1948). A Philosophy for UNESCO. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 573-586.
Moghadam, V.M. and Elveren, D. (2008). The Making of an International Convention:
Culture and Free Trade in a Global Era. Review of International Studies, Vol. 34, 4.
Mojan, Brij. (2005). New internationalism: social work's dilemmas, dreams
and delusion. International Social Work 43 (3):241-250.
Mulhern, F., (2000). Culture/metaculture. London: Routledge.
Myers, F. (2000). Harold Macmillen's "Winds of Change" Speech: A Case Study in the
Rhetoric of Policy Change. Rhetoric & Public Affairs , 3 (4), 555-575.
NRC. (1984). UNESCO Science Programs: Impacts of U.S. Withdrawal and Suggestions
for Alternative Interim Arrangements. NRC Publication
Nye, J., (1990). Soft Power, Foreign Policy.
Nye, J., (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Perseus Books
Group, Cambridge, MA.
Olsen, S. R., (1999). Hollywood Planet: Global Media and the Competitive Advantage of
Narrative Transparency. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Park, H. (1998). A Gramscian approach to interpreting international communication.
Journal of Communication, Autumn 1998.
Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1968). The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation. (J. Wilkinson, & P. Weaver, Trans.) Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press.
Robinson, W.I. & Harris, J. (2000). Towards a global ruling class? Globalization and the
transnational capitalist class. Science & Society, Spring 2000.
Schaefer, B. (2001). Not the Time for the United States to Rejoin UNESCO. Heritage
Foundation Newsletter, January 17, 2001.
Schattle, H. (2005). Communicating Global Citizenship: Multiple Discourses beyond the
Academy. Citizenship Studies 9 (2):119-133.
Schiller, H.I., Preston, W., Herman, E.S., (1989). Hope and folly: the United States and

129

Unesco, 1945-1985, Media & society ; 3. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Semati, M. (2004). New Frontiers in International Communication Theory. Laham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Semmel, A. K. (1976). Foreign News in Four U.S. Elite Dailies: Some
Comparisons. Journalism Quarterly, 53: pp. 734-736.
Senarclens, P. de. (1985). The Smashed Mirror of Past Illusions, Society, October, 1985,
pp. 6-14.
Sewell, J. (1975). UNESCO and world politics: engaging in international relations.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Shawn, E. (2006). The U.N. Exposed: How the United Nations Sabotages America’s
Security and Fails the World, Sentinel Publishing, New York, New York.
Silverblatt, A. & Zlobin, N. (2004). International Communications: A Media Literacy
Approach. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Siochuru, S. (2004). Will the Real WSIS Please Stand Up?: The Historic Encounter of
the ‘Information Society’ and the ‘Communication Society’. Gazette, 66:203.
Smiers, J. (2004). The Utility of a Global Forum: UNESCO’s Significance for
Communication, Culture and ICT’s. Media international Australia, no. 111.
Smith, S., (1995). The self-images of a discipline: a genealogy of IR theory. In S. Smith
and K Booth, eds. International relations theory today. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Strauber, I. L. (1986). The Rhetoric of an Ordinary Political Argument: Liberalism and
Zionism. The Western Political Quarterly , 603-622.
UNESCO (1980), Records of the General Conference, vol 1, Res 14/19
UNESCO Executive Board. (1987). Mintues from UNESCO Executive Board meeting.
UNESDOC. Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO Executive Board. (1984). Minutes from the 119 session of the UNESCO
Executive Board. UNESDOC (pp. 1-25). Paris: UNESCO Archives.
UNESCO Executive Board. (1986). Minutes from UNESCO Executive Board meeting.
UNESDOC. Paris: UNESCO.
UNESCO Executive Board. (1985). Mnutes from the 121st session of the UNESCO
Executive Board. UNESDOC (pp. 1-21). Paris: UNESCO.

130

UNESCO, documents accessible at http://www.unesco.org
Walker, R.B.J., 1993. The concept of culture in the theory of IR. In: J. Chay, ed. Culture
and international relations. New York: Praeger.
Wells, C. (1987). The UN, UNESCO and the Politics of Knowledge. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Williams, D.H. (1985). The U.S. – UNESCO and the New World Information Order. The
National War College Strategic Studies Report Abstract.

